

Amsterdam
School



for Social science Research

ASSR Working paper 04/09

October 2009

THE GERMAN EU PRESIDENCY AND ENERGY POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

Insights From Liberal Intergovernmentalist and Institutionalist Approaches

Emma C. Verhoeff and Arne Niemann

Emma Verhoeff works at the Greek Permanent Representation to the OSCE in Vienna.
Arne Niemann is a lecturer in European Integration Studies and International Relations
at the Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam.

ASSR WORKING PAPER SERIES

[HTTP://WWW.ASSR.NL/](http://www.assr.nl/)

EMAIL: ASSRWORKINGPAPERS@FMG.UVA.NL

ABSTRACT*

This article analyses the formation and development of Member State preferences and positions before and during the European Union (EU) Presidency term. We question the extent to which Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) furthers our understanding of state¹ behaviour in the context of holding the EU Presidency. Our findings suggest that LI adequately explains the formation of German positions prior to assuming office, as German policy objectives chiefly reflect and stand for domestic producers' interests. However, LI cannot satisfactorily account for German governmental action after taking on the Presidency role, during which time it largely downplayed domestic preferences. Instead, Presidency norms dominated its action. For a (substantially) enhanced understanding of governmental behaviour during the Presidency we advocate drawing on institutionalist approaches which we go on to substantiate empirically. Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) highlights Germany's restraint from defending its original domestic preferences due to rational calculation embedded in normative (Presidency) constraints. Compliance with Presidency norms of impartiality (and consensus-building/solidarity) was considered advantageous, as it safeguarded Germany's mediator role, because of diffuse long-term reputational concerns, and due to peer pressure. Sociological institutionalism (SI) can account for the reprioritisation of objectives mainly through the taken-for-grantedness of Presidency norms (that have been thoroughly internalised). We argue that RCI and SI can in many respects be regarded as complementary rather than competing.

Please send correspondence to a.niemann@uva.nl.

* We would like to thank the editorial committee of the ASSR working paper series for the constructive and valuable comments on a previous version of the paper and Bertus de Jong for valuable research assistance.

¹ Our understanding of the term "state" is based on Max Weber's definition of the state as the organisation that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (which may include a number of different institutions such as the police, the military, courts, the civil service and others). However, within the context of this paper we mainly imply "government" when speaking of "state".

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this article is to investigate the formation and development of a Member State's (concretely Germany's) preferences and positions prior to and during its Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers. What are the key determinants of domestic preference configuration before assuming the Presidency role and what happens to domestic preferences/interests and national positions during its stint? This question is of substantial importance for the study of European integration. It touches upon, and can arguably be seen as a proxy for, the more fundamental question of whether, and the extent to which, (formal and informal) institutions may impact on 'national interests'. This question has, in varying facets, played a role in the traditional neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist divide (Haas 1958; Hoffmann 1995; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Niemann 2006: ch. 5), but has also been important in conceptual discussions surrounding the 'new institutionalism' and its application to EU Studies (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Pollack 1996). As a starting point of our analysis we have taken LI (Moravcsik 1993, 1998), which can be regarded as the mainstream account when it comes to conceptualising domestic preference formation.

Our empirical parameters include the following: as a case study we have chosen the German (2007) Presidency concerning energy policy towards Russia. This seems to constitute a crucial (here most-likely) case for LI because bigger and more powerful Member States have been considered to be more likely to act in accordance with their national preferences during their term of office (Elgström 2003b: 39). In addition, relations towards Russia and (external) energy policy have both gradually been gaining in (political and economic) salience in terms of the (domestic and foreign) policy objectives of both Germany and the EU (Timmermann 2007; Bastian 2006; Singhofen 2007; Buhbe 2007). Energy policy has received increased attention in the EU as a result of growing concerns regarding energy security but also due to environmental considerations. Relations with Russia have attained increased significance as Russia constitutes the largest outside supplier of oil and gas to the EU, and also because it is by far the biggest and most powerful neighbour of the Union (Kempe 2007b; Zargorsky 2007). The EU

Presidency – which arguably constitutes a key, if not *the* key (institutional) actor in the current EU negotiating infrastructure (cf. Elgstöm 2006: 174) – is circumscribed by several important norms, such as impartiality. Presidency norms may (thus) provide informal institutions that tend to counteract the pursuit of domestic preferences.

Against this backdrop, we argue that the original German position (before assuming the Presidency) can be adequately explained through a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. The Federal government's choices were shaped by the preferences and constraints stemming from the most important economic constituents. But how can it be explained that Germany changed its position upon assuming the Council Presidency given the hitherto clear positioning of the German government on EU-Russian relations in line with its domestic preferences, the strength of domestic preferences and the priority that Germany had attributed to the Russia dossier? We hold that institutionalist approaches are much better suited to explicating the conduct of the federal government throughout its Presidency. During that time the impact of institutions on governmental action became an important factor, particularly the norms (of impartiality and consensus-seeking/solidarity) inherent in the Presidency role. Presidency norms influenced the German government in different respects: (a) instrumentally (as suggested by RCI), i.e. through cost-benefit calculations inducing norm compliance; (b) genuinely-normatively (as proposed by SI), i.e. because norms like impartiality were taken for granted.

We proceed as follows: first, we review the relevant (mainly conceptual) literature and thus also outline the liberal intergovernmentalist account as well as two institutional approaches to analysing the EU Presidency. Second, we sketch out the actors, preferences and positions pertaining to German energy policy (prior to holding the Presidency). In the third and main part of this article we analyse the federal government's behaviour during its Presidency. Here, we particularly probe explanations based on LI, RCI and SI in terms of the insights they (can) provide for understanding German governmental action. Finally, we conclude by putting our findings into a broader perspective and offer some thoughts on bridging RCI and SI.

1. APPROACH

1.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)

LI is embedded in a wider rationalist framework of international cooperation. Rationalism stipulates an explanation of actor preferences and collective outcomes as a result of individual actions. Actors calculate the utility of different courses of action and choose the one that maximises their utility. Within the rationalist framework LI contains three more focused theories: a liberal theory of national preference formation, an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation, and a theory of institutional choice (Moravcsik 1998: 19-20).

The first stage of LI – which constitutes the focus of our analysis – accounts for national preferences. Drawing on liberal theories of international relations, which concentrate on state-society relations, the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik 1997). National preferences emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognised by governments. For Moravcsik, an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition, not a supplement, to the analysis of the strategic interactions among states. According to Moravcsik, national preferences are defined as an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes that might result from international political action. By preferences, Moravcsik designates not simply a particular set of policy goals, but a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular international negotiation (Moravcsik 1998: 20). Preferences reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus; they are assumed to be stable within each position advanced on each issue by each country in each negotiation, but not necessarily across negotiations, issues or countries. The term (preferences) distinguishes such underlying goals from the particular transient bargaining positions, negotiating strategies, or policy aims that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. Preferences are exogenous to a specific international political environment (Moravcsik 1998: 24).

LI distinguishes two broad categories of motivation that might account for underlying national preferences. First, geopolitical interests reflect perceived threats to national sovereignty or territorial integrity; secondly, and more importantly, economic interests: these reflect the imperatives induced by interdependence and the large increase in opportunities for profitable cross-border trade and capital movements and mirror 'primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers' (Moravcsik 1998: 3, 26). The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office. In domestic politics, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, and interest groups, whose views are transmitted through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. The foreign policy goals of national governments are therefore viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik 1993: 481). Through such processes emerges the set of national preferences or goals that states bring to international negotiations.

This brings us to the second stage of LI: states develop strategies and bargain with one another to reach substantive agreements that realise those national preferences more efficiently than unilateral actions do. This intergovernmental (mainly hard) bargaining process is characterised, among other attributes, by 'credible threats to veto proposals, to withhold financial side-payments, and to form alternative alliances excluding recalcitrant governments'. In intergovernmental bargaining, outcomes 'reflected the relative power of states – more precisely, patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. Those who gained the most economically from integration compromised the most on the margin to realize it, whereas those who gained the least [...] imposed conditions' (Moravcsik 1998: 3).

In his 1998 book, Moravcsik went beyond the two-stage model stipulated previously and formulated an account of institutional choice. Competencies are delegated to supranational institutions primarily in order to address problems of incomplete contracting, compliance and monitoring. Sovereignty is transferred to EU institutions especially in those fields where 'potential joint gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective' (Moravcsik 1998: 9).

However, for Moravcsik the role of supranational institutions is limited: institutions promote international cooperation by providing a negotiating forum with bureaucratic institutions that disseminate information and policy ideas. Greater information and predictability reduce the cost of bargaining and the risk of unilateral non-compliance (Moravcsik 1993: 508). He does not ascribe them a significant influence on decision outcomes. Instead, they are used by the governments as a platform to pursue their own interest. The preferences of social groups are aggregated through political institutions. According to Moravcsik, these institutions have no independent causal role (Moravcsik 1993: 515). In his 1998 account, Moravcsik is arguably slightly less sceptical about the role of (supranational) institutions.² Yet, even here he suggests that they tend ‘to be futile and redundant, even sometimes counterproductive’, thus still viewing the role of supranational entrepreneurship in the European integration process as marginal (Moravcsik 1998: 8, 490-494).

Moravcsik does not explicitly link LI to the role of member governments holding the EU Presidency and the influence of national preferences on the Presidency. However, given LI’s substantial theoretical ambitions, we can extrapolate that the goals of a country holding the Presidency should reflect (and be substantially influenced by) the preferences and pressures of dominant domestic interest groups. The member government in charge of the Presidency recognises and aggregates the preferences emerging from domestic political interaction and conflict. From an LI perspective the institution of the chair (and the norms attached to it) should not substantially influence the behaviour the Member State in question.

1.2. The EU Council Presidency: different perspectives

The Member State holding the six-monthly rotating EU Presidency is responsible for chairmanship at different levels of the Council framework, ranging from working groups and committees of the Council to the level of heads of state and government in the European Council. With the Luxembourg Compromise, which forced the Commission to

² This seems to apply mainly to day-to-day policy-making rather than grand bargains. But here Moravcsik (1998: 8) seems to restrict (the limited) supranational influence to decisions under qualified majority voting and areas where substantial prior delegation had taken place.

take a back seat, and the arrival of European Political Cooperation (EPC), Technical Councils and the European Council, the role of the Council Presidency began to increase and gradually developed into an alternative architect of compromise and progress (Edwards and Wallace 1977). Now the significance of the Presidency in the EU's institutional and decision-making architecture is widely acknowledged (e.g. Tallberg 2006; Schout 1998).

Today, the main roles of the Presidency are widely recognised as those of 'administrator', ensuring smooth and efficient functioning of processes; 'representative', internally *vis-à-vis* other EU institutions and externally in international negotiations; 'leader', providing a strategic perspective and ensuring progress; and finally 'broker', breaking deadlocks and mediating compromises. In addition, the Presidency stint is seen by many actors (especially in the domestic arena) as an opportunity to further particular national preferences, also referred to as the role of 'bargainer'.³ Given these diverse roles, the Presidency task is manifold, diverse and complex. It places the Member State in office at the centre of the EU negotiation process (cf. Elgstöm 2006: 174).

In the execution of its functions, the chair is constrained by both formal rules and informal norms. According to Tallberg (2004: 1005) formal constraints come in two shapes: institutional procedures for the office of the chair, and decision rules for the adoption of proposals. Institutional procedures provide the formal basis of the office and include appointment, administrative and oversight procedures. Decision rules shape the ease with which the chair can promote proposals that satisfy the requirements of efficient negotiation, yet meet the interests of the chair. Informal constraints consist of established norms about the appropriate behaviour of the chair. Norms are 'collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity' (Katzenstein 1996: 5). They embody a quality of 'oughtness' and a shared moral assessment (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892) that sets norms apart from other kind of rules. Three Presidency norms are regarded as particularly important: impartiality, consensus-building and effectiveness (Elgström: 2006: 178).

There is disagreement in the literature as to the extent to which Presidency norms affect the behaviour of the Member State at the helm. That Member States holding the

³ On the different Presidency roles see e.g. Wallace (1985), Schout (1998), Elgström (2003b), Kirchner (1992).

Presidency abide, for instance, by the impartiality norm – which has received most attention from academic observers – was for some time virtually uncontested in the literature (e.g. Wallace 1985: 16; Kirchner and Tsagkari 1993: 20; Laffan 2004). More recently, the view of the impartial Presidency has been challenged by some authors (most persuasively Tallberg 2006) who suggest that the Member State at the helm tends to pursue national preferences.

The degree to which Member States at the helm are constrained in their behaviour by norms (and formal institutions) has been viewed differently in the literature. Elgström (2003a: 10-14) as well as Elgström and Tallberg (2003: 192-202) explain Presidency behaviour from two different perspectives; the rationalist and the sociological one.

The rational choice institutionalist perspective

This approach generally perceives politics as governed by a ‘logic of consequences’ (March and Olsen 1998: 949-950; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001: 7-10). Accordingly, the rational choice institutionalist account of the Presidency regards EU negotiations and decision-making as a strategic environment, in which rational actors, including the Presidency, seek to attain (largely exogenously) given preferences. The Presidency is thus conceptualised as a cost-benefit calculator and the office of the Presidency is seen as an additional opportunity for the Member State in office to fulfil national interests (Elgström and Tallberg 2003). Tallberg (2004, 2006) has pointed out that the office of the Presidency contains a number of power resources which allow Member States to further their preferences during their term. Presidencies, above all, enjoy substantial informational power (due to privileged access to information) and considerable procedural powers (because of asymmetric control over negotiation procedures).

From a ‘pure’ rational choice institutionalist perspective formal institutions may enable or constrain Presidency action (Tallberg 2006: 33-37). Elgström and Tallberg (2003: 192, 196) in their formulation of a rationalist perspective have also included informal institutions (norms) as constraining the Presidency. Given such institutional constraints, Presidency behaviour is not always characterised by ‘forcing’ strategies (which aim at self-interest maximisation unconcerned with other parties) or ‘competitive’

strategies (which aim at relative gains irrespective of potential absolute gains), but may also display, for instance, ‘accommodating’ strategies (aimed mainly at maximising other parties’ interests), for example, when a Presidency needs to prove its ‘European credentials’ (Elgström 2003a: 12).

Compared with LI, institutions are ascribed a somewhat more influential role in the rational choice institutionalist approach. They begin to matter, albeit rather (still) as ‘intervening’ variables (Tallberg 2006: 5). Hence, this perspective on the EU Presidency would see the office of the chair to have some bearing on the behaviour of the Member State at the helm. Norms as informal institutions are attributed a certain (constraining) role. They are enacted as a result of cost-benefit calculations, because non-compliance could compromise one’s reputation or provoke non-cooperation from other governments.

The sociological institutionalist perspective

From a sociological institutionalist perspective, politics is ruled by a ‘logic of appropriateness’. The behaviour of actors is determined by what they think is expected from them, or by what they themselves believe is appropriate in a given situation, rather than by cost-benefit calculations. Authority is based on social acceptance, legitimacy and trust rather than on hierarchy and formal/material power (March and Olsen 1998: 951-952; cf. Checkel 2001). This approach thus emphasises the importance of norms and role conceptions, rather than fixed interests, for explaining Presidency behaviour. These stem, most substantially, from the institution of the Presidency itself, whereby any Member State in office is expected to act in a certain way.

There is no one coherent sociological approach to the Presidency. Elgström (2003a, 2006) focuses mostly on Presidency role conceptions. The manner in which a role is played is to a certain degree a result of learning and socialisation processes, where identities and role conceptions of actors entering the role are confronted with existing expectations (Elgström 2006: 173). Country-based traditions, expectations and role conceptions can develop through (repeated) experiences from Member State’s former Presidency terms. Collective expectations – carried by domestic and external actors – may constitute strong determinants of what is regarded appropriate behaviour.

Lewis (2006) takes the sociological approach a step further. He emphasises that the Presidency has an institutional mechanism that tends to foster processes whereby Presidency norms become internalised into self-conceptions of interest (Lewis 2006: 12, 15). Hence, Lewis goes beyond what Checkel (2005: 804) has referred to as ‘Type I’ norm internalisation (conscious role playing). Rather, his account accentuates that the office of the Presidency tends to lead to ‘Type II’ norm internalisation where Community/Presidency norms are accepted as ‘the right thing to do’ and instrumental calculation has been replaced by ‘taken-for-grantedness’.

The sociological (institutionalist) approach places more weight on the influence of Presidency norms on state behaviour than the rational choice institutionalist approach. Norms are complied with not out of an instrumental rationale, but because they are – following the thicker sociological variant – truly internalised and taken for granted. Norms do not merely ‘constrain’, but rather ‘constitute’ behaviour (cf. Hall and Taylor 1996). Given the existence of Presidency norms such as impartiality or consensus-building, the sociological line of reasoning would suggest that the chair is unlikely to uncompromisingly pursue national interests, where these are different from the EU mainstream.

1.3. Research design and methodology

On the basis of these conceptual underpinnings we will subsequently turn to the empirical investigation of (German) governmental action before and during the Council Presidency. First, however, we will specify some important aspects concerning our research design and methodology. Our empirical analysis is advanced primarily through an investigation of alternative explanations and process tracing (George 1979). As for the latter, multiple observations concerning structural dynamics and actors’ attitudes/behaviours are traced, presented, analysed and discussed. This way integrative knowledge is gained concerning the nature and composition of causal mechanisms and processes (George and McKeown 1985). Process tracing has been put into practice through triangulation across different data sources, including official as well as unofficial documentation, secondary literature, major media, and about thirty interviews, with officials from several (federal)

government departments, private industry, EU institutions, and the Russian administration.

A few words on what type of case study this constitutes. In our view, the case of the German (2007) Presidency concerning energy policy towards Russia constitutes a ‘more-likely’ (but perhaps not most-likely) case: (i) bigger and more powerful Member States have been considered to be more likely to act in accordance with their national preferences during their term of office (Elgström 2003b: 39); (ii) in terms of the degree of national unity in the pulling and hauling of domestic interest group politics, one might expect LI-consistent interest-group politics to cast a shadow on a state's behaviour when assuming the Presidency to the extent that there is some coherence to the position that gets aggregated in the domestic political process. The German case suggests precisely such coherence to the influence of German business lobbies that were influential in the pre-Presidency phase; (iii) however, Germany’s history and experience in the EU (and of holding the EU Presidency) suggests a behaviour that is rather predisposed to comply with (Presidency/EU) norms.⁴ Given the last point, our study cannot be considered a clear-cut example of a most-likely case study, but still constitutes a ‘more likely’ case for LI. Further methodological pointers will be provided along the way.

2. GERMAN ENERGY POLICY: ACTORS, PREFERENCES AND POSITIONS

2.1. German domestic interest formation

In the federal government nine ministries are concerned with energy policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economics and Technology pay particular attention to external energy policy. In line with the general division of power within the German government, during the EU Presidency, each ministry governed their own area of operations within the framework set by the Chancellor through policy guidelines. The Chancellery was responsible for overall policy formulation, supervision and management of the Presidency. The Ministry of Foreign

⁴ Thanks to the editorial committee of the ASSR working paper series for suggesting the last two points.

Affairs was in charge of the Presidency's micro-management and most areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Kurpas and Rieke 2007: 42-43).

The domestic energy economy and its structure is one of the most important determinants for German energy policy (Laumanns 2005: 283). The government has only limited influence on energy companies (Grotz 2005: 143). 'Governmental energy policy only generally delineates conditions for firms' (interview with E. Hippe, Ministry of Economics, Berlin, April 2007). German energy companies are among the most important actors in the energy relationship with Russia. They have direct (by lobbying) and indirect (in securing supply) influence on the federal government. As one observer put it, 'around every Bundestag representative there are ten lobbyists and it is all about money' (interview R. Götz, German Institute for Security and Foreign Affairs, Berlin, June 2007). An important player in the energy field is the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations (*Ost Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft*), a joint organisation of the leading associations representing German business. The Committee represents and pools the interests of German business in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Even if the energy industry does not explicitly express its wishes, its interests are usually taken into account by policy makers (Tönjes 2007). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, closely engages and cooperates with German energy companies. On his foreign trips he often takes along representatives from the German energy industry. More than his predecessor, Steinmeier sees external energy policy as a vital aspect of German foreign policy (Tönjes 2007: 32; cf. Steinmeier 2006a, 2006b).

2.2. Position and Preferences towards Russia

In the governing coalition, the Social Democrats (SPD) have, for historical reasons⁵ and because of close contacts between the former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the Russian (ex-)President Vladimir Putin, been working towards a close relationship ('strategic partnership') with Russia (cf. SPD 2007). The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) have tended to be more critical towards the Russian government and have

⁵ Willy Brandt, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1966-1969 and Chancellor from 1969-1974 pursued the strategies of 'Ostpolitik' and 'Wandel durch Annäherung' (change through rapproachment), a policy that sought (and also largely succeeded to) to normalise the Federal Republic's relations with Eastern European countries, including Russia.

adopted a wider geographical focus in their energy policy (cf. CDU/CSU 2005). Overall, the federal government under Chancellor Angela Merkel has taken a more sober approach towards Russia than the Schröder government, but the building of a ‘strategic partnership’ is still seen as essential (Singhofen 2007).

As Germany has – both traditionally and in the more recent past – entertained close ties with Russia, it has been argued that Germany constitutes the ‘engine’ in the EU–Russia relationship (Timmerman 2007). Therefore, during its EU Presidency, Germany had the opportunity to use its ‘special’ ties with Russia to provide impetus for the development of EU-Russian relations (Singhofen 2007; Lindner 2007: 80). This approach towards Russia has to be seen in the context of a new policy strategy towards the neighbouring eastern European countries, which was termed ‘*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*’ (‘approach by interdependence’), in the broad context of a ‘*neue Ostpolitik*’, a ‘new Eastern-policy’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b; Steinmeier 2007; Kempe 2007a).⁶ It intended to set up a free-trade zone, to intensify cooperation in security policy and to build a closer energy relationship with Russia. The increasing importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) placed the EU in a competing position towards Russia in the post Soviet area (Lippert 2007: 12-13). Germany tried to show through its strategy of *Annäherung durch Verflechtung* that it preferred cooperation to competition. This was to be understood as the signal given by the EU. The main goal was to tie Russia irreversibly in a cooperative and integrative common European system (Merkel and Barosso 2006; Bundesregierung 2007b; Dauderstädt *et al.* 2007).

The most important period for the preparation of the Presidency was from September to December 2006. Various documents, speeches, and meetings indicated that the relationship with Russia constituted one of the priorities of the German Presidency (Bundesregierung 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a; Silberberg 2006; Steinmeier 2006c). In the Chancellery it was the ‘Europe’ department and the department for Foreign and Security policy that had strategic authority. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was the Planning Commission (*Planungsstab*) that paid particular attention to the formulation of policy towards Russia.

⁶ This follows ‘*Wandel durch Annäherung*’, the political strategy under Chancellor Willy Brandt in the late 1960s.

German companies are very active in the energy sector in Russia. The cooperation between the German and Russian companies aims at energy security and energy efficiency. The energy lobby prefers a close relationship with Russia (interview Ministry of Economics, Berlin, April 2007; Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2006a, 2006b). Industrial integration and a more symmetric relationship are considered beneficial by German companies as they would have more reliable possibilities to engage in the Russian market. Companies and agencies that have a strong interest in the Russian market (and in a close relationship with Russia) include E.ON, BASF, Wintershall, Metro, Knauf and DENA (German Energy Agency). These firms would like to see some provisions of the Energy Charter in a renewed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). They are particularly interested in (mutual) market access, the acceptance of strict codes of competition, reliability on the rule of law on both sides, and strengthening the principles of transparency and security of investment in the EU-Russia relationship (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2006a; Steinmeier 2006a).

The preferences of the domestic energy industry and its structure constitute one of the most important determinants for German energy policy, including the formation of energy policy *vis-à-vis* Russia. Companies (such as those mentioned above) lobby by expressing their wishes to the government (often also through the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations). They also influence matters by showing an interest in cooperating with the biggest energy company in Russia, Gazprom, not least through joint ventures between Gazprom and BASF subsidiary Wintershall such as WINGAS and WIEH (Sander 2007). A strategic working group at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made up of representatives from government and industry, is one of the central fora for discussing economic and financial issues of German-Russian relations. It discusses and advances concrete cooperation in key areas of the two economies. Through this strategic working group, the government is constantly informed about the energy companies' priorities. As 'the German-Russian relationship is built on economic ties...and we absolutely do not want to exclude Russia'⁷ and since German energy companies have made agreements (with Gazprom) for the next twenty years, the German government was

⁷ Interview, Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, Berlin, May 2007.

‘naturally considerably influenced by these energy companies and their economic interest when defining policy for its Presidency stint’ (interview, Chancellery, Berlin 2008).

The influence of the German (energy) industry on the formulation of the government’s (energy) policy concerning its Presidency can be further substantiated. First, there is a clear correlation between the wishes of German industry and the government’s policy position in the run-up to the Presidency term. This included above all (a) starting the negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA); (b) the finalisation of the energy chapter with Russia under the PCA on the basis of the principles of the Energy Charter Treaty; (c) integrating and implementing the G8 Action Plan for Global Energy Security into EU-Russian relations; and (d) advancing negotiations on the Transit protocol⁸ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a; Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2006a; Steinmeier 2006a). Industrial integration (*‘Verflechtung’*) through a new PCA with an integrated energy chapter was to facilitate EU companies’ access to the Russian market and strengthen investment security (and stable legal framework provisions more generally), goals that were of particular interest to German firms. Second, our interviews at the various government departments, with business representatives and at the joint organisation of leading business associations suggests that the federal government’s emerging position on Russia in the run up to the German Presidency was (very) largely determined by the concerns and needs of German business. As one government official remarked, ‘after all, it is for them that we do this policy. They are the direct recipients and beneficiaries of deepening economic relations with Russia’ (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin 2008). On the part of German industry it did not require hard lobbying to have its requests heard in Berlin. ‘It was more a question of explaining and informing what would be beneficial for German business. We frequently talked with the relevant government agencies at various levels before the Presidency. They knew exactly what we regarded important, but this was not controversial as they very largely supported our concerns’ (interview, Committee on Eastern Economic Relations, 2007). The dialogue with politics is so well-established that even when the (energy) industry does not explicitly express its interests, these are usually

⁸ The Transit Protocol is a part of the Energy Charter Treaty. It obliges Signatory states, in accordance with the GATT/WTO principles of freedom to transit, to facilitate transport on a non-discriminatory basis.

still taken into consideration by policy makers (Tönjes 2007, interview, Chancellery, Berlin, March 2008).

The period analysed here, i.e. before the start of the German Presidency, largely corresponds with liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The German government's policy goals mirrored 'primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers', as assumed by Moravcsik (1998: 3, 26). Hence, it seemed as if Germany was going to use the Presidency (as regards EU-Russian relations) to a certain extent, as a tool to promote national preferences.

3. GERMANY HOLDING THE EU PRESIDENCY

The German government generally faced high expectations regarding its double Presidency of the European Union and the group of advanced industrial countries (G8) (Maurer 2007; Paterson 2006). However, Berlin had to deal with many leftovers of former Presidencies and had integrated its own agenda with those of the two successive Presidencies, Portugal and Slovenia (Mair and Perthes 2006; Council of the European Union 2006). The federal government made it clear at the outset that the strengthening of the relationship with Russia was one of the priorities during its Presidency (Lindner 2007; Kempe 2007a; Kurpas and Riecke 2007). The EU-Russia dossier became an important one, not only because of its content but also because of the extensive broker role that Germany was to play on the issue during its Presidency (Lindner 2007).

Germany's standing in the EU, its role as Russia's most important trade partner and energy buyer and generally its 'special' relationship with Russia resulted in high expectations on the German Presidency – domestically, by some EU states, and also by Russian authorities – concerning a dynamic development of the relationship with Russia (Kurpas and Riecke 2007; Himmelreich 2007a; interview, Russian embassy, Berlin, 2007). But these hopes were not shared by all EU Member States. Some of the new Central Eastern European Member States expressed concerns as regards EU-Russian negotiations based on German preferences. They sought to give stronger consideration to human

rights and democratic values in the new agreement and thematised their bilateral difficulties with the Russian government (Kempe 2007b).

3.1. The Change of the German (Presidency) position

In the months prior to the Presidency, Germany had shown an approach that mainly reflected its 'national interests' on the Russia dossier. It was to intensify economic integration, particularly in terms of facilitating access to the Russian market and improving investment security for (EU) companies, while encouraging Russia to become a trusted energy supplier. Negotiations concerning the renewal of the PCA with a reformulated energy chapter were planned to start swiftly (Merkel 2006). The Presidency was thus viewed as an opportunity to change the interdependence between Germany and Russia to an interdependence between the EU and Russia. The '*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*' approach, clearly emphasising cooperative aspects, took a (very) positive/benign view on Russia. This position began to alter as Germany took over the EU Presidency. Germany gradually ceased to act as an 'advocate' of Russia in the EU. It mainly concentrated on building a common position and consensus within the EU, since it faced (strong) reservations from some Member States, as it was expected to provide brokerage within the EU, and to demonstrate to Russia that the EU was one unified actor. Due to these factors, which will be specified and illustrated in a more detailed manner below, Germany gradually shifted its stance during the Presidency.

The '*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*' line was increasingly abandoned as a Presidency priority (Merkel 2007d; Financial Times Deutschland 11/05/2007; Lindner 2007: 81). At the beginning of the Presidency period Chancellor Merkel was still convinced that a new EU-Russia partnership deal 'was strongly needed ... in order to fill the strategic partnership with life' (Merkel 2007c, 2007d). Later, in the run up to the Samara Summit, this conviction was no longer evident and her tone had changed. The Chancellor had begun to criticise Moscow's behaviour more openly and also addressed restrictions on the freedom of assembly and the media in Russia (Federal Government 2007a). Internal EU expectations and external factors influenced the EU-Russia relations and thus the agenda of the German Presidency. The demands on the Presidency's

activities as broker increased and Germany more clearly started to show Russia that it would speak up for other Member States (Lindner 2007).

While ‘*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*’ was abandoned as Germany’s *Presidency* approach concerning the EU-Russian relations, it remained an unaltered part of Germany’s own (national/domestic) position concerning relations with Russia. More generally, basic preferences in Germany remained unchanged. Domestic industry still backed and pushed for the underlying ideas of closer economic cooperation/integration (interview, Committee on Eastern Economic Relations, 2007). In addition, the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry also supported this policy in principle (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Even though the German preferences were still based on the extension of ‘*Verflechtung*’, this was not displayed in its *Presidency* role on the Russia dossier, including the negotiations with Russia at the Samara Summit.

Faced with the prospect of furthering its national interests on the one hand, and the reservations of other EU Member States, its own expectations in terms of holding a successful *Presidency* and important norms attached to the office of the *Presidency* on the other, the German *Presidency* very largely resisted its national interests and concentrated on mediation and building a common EU stance. The German government continued to hope for constructive negotiations at the Samara Summit, but took a step back in promoting its aims of getting the Energy Charter provisions into a PCA (and trying to advance EU-Russian ties based on mutual and equitable interdependence) and more prominently showed that it did not use its relations in order to reap national economic benefits (Lindner 2007). Instead, ‘European interests’ (and *Presidency* norms) dominated the behaviour of the *Presidency*. EU-Russian negotiations were largely unsuccessful, and the Samara Summit was widely described in negative terms⁹. Eventually, the new PCA, and hence the provisions of the Energy Charter, were hardly discussed at the Summit (interview European Commission, Brussels, June 2007).

⁹The only substantive results of the Summit were declarations of intent concerning: (1) education and research projects; (2) cooperation between the space-based satellite systems; (3) a reinforced dialogue on furthering investments; (4) agreement on climate change; and (5) an early warning system in the area of energy security.

The subsequent analysis will explain why and how Germany altered its position while holding the Council Presidency. First, we argue that LI cannot sufficiently account for this development.

3.2. A liberal intergovernmentalist account

We argue that LI can explain German Presidency behaviour only to a very limited degree. First, for Moravcsik (1998: 8f) institutions are ‘thin’ in the sense that they are granted hardly any explanatory power in terms of state preferences and policy outcomes. Instead, they are mainly seen as a platform for pursuing Member States’ national interests. Extrapolating from liberal intergovernmentalist thought, presiding Member States are likely to play the role of a ‘bargainer’ Presidency, which makes national interests their priority and they continue to act as they usually do, despite holding the Presidency (cf. Elgström 2003a: 14). Hence, from an LI perspective the institution of the chair should not substantially influence the behaviour the Member State in question. Germany’s Presidency behaviour does not reflect these assumptions. As alluded to above, and further demonstrated below, when holding the Presidency Germany’s national preferences (as defined prior to taking office) did not prevail. Instead, the ‘*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*’ line, which reflected German domestic preferences, was abandoned during its Presidency, and Germany demonstrably focused on mediating between different Member States’ interests and on promoting ‘European’ rather than national interests.

This brings us to a second, related, point. LI suggests that preferences are exogenously given. They are determined (very) largely by economic interests, especially the commercial interests of powerful economic producers. Domestic preference formation á la Moravcsik would see these preferences, and particularly those by German business interests that favoured closer industrial cooperation, as dominating German (Presidency) behaviour. LI has few conceptual means for explaining different behaviour, and action driven by other rationales. For example, the importance of norms pertaining to the Presidency office, such as impartiality, the relevance of which will be further explicated below, cannot be captured by LI.

Third, Moravcsik (1998: 3) would perhaps refer/resort to the second level of its model, that of intergovernmental bargaining, to make sense of German (Presidency) behaviour. A liberal intergovernmentalist reading would suggest that Germany's lack of bargaining power forced it to compromise. The concept of 'the best alternative to a negotiated agreement' would suggest that Germany as the party likely to gain most from far-reaching EU agreements (furthering industrial integration) had relatively little bargaining power and thus had to compromise (substantially) on its plans for intensifying EU-Russian relations. In addition, Poland and others threatened to use their veto to prevent the start of the negotiations.

However, this account is problematic: (A) The federal government's negotiating power was far from insubstantial. Officials have stated that Germany held alternatives to a negotiated EU-level agreement. As the Member State maintaining the closest relations with Russia, there was always the option of intensifying economic cooperation on a bilateral basis (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 2007, 2008; cf. Hellenbroch 2007). In addition, Tallberg (2004, 2006) and others have pointed out that the office of the Presidency contains a number of power resources which allow Member States to further their preferences during their term. Presidencies, above all, enjoy substantial informational power (due to privileged access to information) and considerable procedural powers (because of asymmetric control over negotiation procedures). In addition, Germany as the biggest Member State brings substantial material bargaining power to the table. Also, Germany was far from isolated on its plans for further industrial integration with Russia.¹⁰ Hence, an account that seeks to explain the outcome through a lack of German bargaining power is not persuasive.

(B) In addition, such a perspective presumes that Germany would/did bargain in order to realise its preferences, which have been identified as strong in terms of domestic economic interests. However, Germany did not behave like a state that seriously attempted to bargain. The German government did not make use of bargaining tools identified by Moravcsik, such as offering compensation or side-payments (for which there would have been scope in terms of Poland's problems in the negotiations on the

¹⁰ France, the UK and Italy were also in favour of a strategic partnership with Russia (Dauderstädt *et al.* 2006: 45).

Constitutional Treaty) or by voicing threats. The latter could have easily been done by suggesting to compensate for any lack of progress in terms of negotiations on the EU level by intensifying the bi-lateral relationship (at the expense of an EU-wide approach to economic relations with Russia), which would have been resented by a number of (especially Eastern European) Member States (Herold 2007; interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, Berlin, 2007, 2008).

In sum, LI can adequately explain German preference formation prior to assuming the Presidency role. However, it provides a significantly less convincing explanation as to why Germany, while holding clear and strong domestic preferences, decided to downplay these preferences and to act substantially as an impartial broker on the Russia dossier. When holding the Presidency, Member States' choices and actions are conditioned by formal rules and informal norms pertaining to the office and they are, to a considerably greater extent, exposed to EU-level influences, something that cannot be adequately captured by Moravcsik's very thin account of institutions. As a result, we argue that LI lacks important facets for an ample understanding of this case. Thus, we have to go beyond a liberal intergovernmentalist account in order to adequately explain the federal government's action while holding the EU Presidency.

3.3. A rational choice institutionalist approach

In rational choice institutionalist terms the Presidency is still conceptualised as a cost-benefit calculator. Formal institutions and the institutional design of the chairmanship, but also informal institutions (such as norms), may enable or constrain Presidency action (Elgström and Tallberg 2003: 192, 196). Given such institutional constraints, Presidency behaviour can include 'accommodating' strategies (which pay substantial attention to other parties' interests), for example, when a Presidency needs to augment its 'European credentials' (Elgström 2003a: 12). The rational choice institutionalist approach places limited explanatory weight on institutions. They are seen as 'constraining' behaviour in the form of 'intervening' variables (Tallberg 2006: 5). Norms, as informal institutions, are enacted as a result of cost-benefit calculations, because non-compliance could compromise one's reputation or provoke non-cooperation from other governments.

The rational-choice institutionalist account of the Presidency provides useful building blocks for explaining German governmental action when taking over the Council Presidency. Norms of impartiality¹¹ and solidarity/consensus-building¹² constrained German national preferences during its Presidency and induced Germany to play the role of broker rather than bargainer. Many of these normative constraints were, however, (still) led by cost-benefit calculations, as the subsequent analysis will indicate.

In the weeks before the start of the Presidency some Member States voiced their discontent with the Presidency programme, as they saw Germany developing an EU-Russia strategy, based on national interests. They were afraid that Germany would not be neutral in the negotiations with Russia. Especially the Baltic countries, Poland and the Czech Republic communicated their concerns to the German government. Poland was having severe difficulties with the German plans. It vetoed the PCA negotiations already in November 2006 at the EU-Russia Summit in Lahti because Russia upheld import restrictions, above all on Polish meat products, allegedly because of inadequate hygiene standards. Controversy on this issue could not be resolved during the Presidency (Kurpas and Riecke 2007: 21). Another reason for Poland to disagree with German advocacy of closer economic cooperation and industrial integration, was the 2005 agreement on the North European Gas Pipeline that was reached without the consent of the Polish government.¹³ Lithuania also had difficulties with the envisaged German stance. The supply to the only oil processing facility in the Baltic countries was interrupted in June 2006 after a pipeline accident in the Bryansk Region. Lithuania thus supported the Polish veto, unless Russia renewed oil supplies to the Mazeikiu refinery via the Druzhba pipeline (Marakin 2007).

The Polish and Lithuanian concerns rapidly influenced German Presidency behaviour. Within a few weeks the German Presidency pursued a more reluctant approach towards Russia and a more attentive approach towards specific Member States

¹¹ 'Impartiality' is defined here in as process impartiality (even-handedness, not favouring certain parties) and outcome impartiality (results deemed fair) (Elgström 2003c: 44). More generally, impartiality is to denote looking for common (EU) rather than private interests.

¹² 'Solidarity' can be defined as supporting and maintaining a unity (or union) of interests, purposes and responsibilities. The frequently mentioned Presidency norm of 'consensus-building' (building broad agreement) is thus closely related to 'solidarity'.

¹³ The pipeline is being built around Poland. It will thus lose money on transit fees and, therefore, felt 'cheated' (Götz 2005).

(Büchner 2007; Dempsey 2007). The import ban was taken as an ‘EU problem’ and the German Chancellor expended considerable effort in negotiating with the Polish and the Russian governments to solve the conflict (Schuller 2007). German governmental officials and politicians involved in the Presidency made sure that Germany would take its brokerage role seriously. Germany (thus) put much effort into showing other Member States that it would listen to them and that their problems would be taken seriously (interview Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, April 2007). This reportedly happened at all levels (of the Council framework) where the EU-Russian relations were debated, from the Working Group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia via the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the General Affairs and External Relations Council, as also attested by neutral observers (interview, Brussels, 2007). Showing solidarity with the concerns of especially Poland and Lithuania, and building an EU consensus became important aspects of Germany’s handling of the Russia dossier (Lindner 2007).

A number of interviewees admitted that the rationale for accommodating the wishes of Poland and Lithuania was (at least partly) of a self-interested nature. As one official put it, ‘you hurt your role as mediator at later stages, and also the Presidency more generally, when you don’t react on the concerns of other Member States at the beginning [of the Presidency]. So, we did with Poland and others’ (interview at the Chancellery, Berlin, 2008). Another experienced senior civil servant noted, ‘the Presidency comes at a price. If we hadn’t paid then, we would have had to pay later. And then we probably would have had to pay more because most of the china would have been broken. I mean, once others lose trust, you cannot broker effectively any more. Moreover, you still need to work together later; damaging your image will also be costly in the long-run’ (interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).

Approaching the Samara Summit, the EU tried not to get too deeply involved in the dispute between Estonia and Russia about the relocation of a Soviet World War II monument (Wetzel and Schmidt 2007), but after a blockade of the Estonian embassy in Moscow, and violent scenes at a news conference given by the Estonian ambassador, the European Commission urged Russia to observe UN conventions on the protection of diplomats. There was also concern in the EU that Russia was deliberately obstructing trade with Estonia. The Eastern European member states asked for a tougher stand

towards Russia and proposed a 'reflection phase' before negotiations on the PCA should start (Financial Times Deutschland 13/05/2007; Lindner 2007: 81). Even though its economic preferences led Germany to favour commencing the PCA negotiations at the Summit, it was felt that in holding the Presidency Germany should support the Eastern European Member States. Some officials remarked that 'this was important also in view of the upcoming negotiations to put the Constitutional Treaty back on track, for which we needed these Member States, and especially Poland, to be constructive. Hence, it was also a question of not putting them off' (interview, Berlin 2008). As a result, the German Presidency position further shifted towards a more reserved and distanced EU approach towards EU-Russian relations (Financial Times Deutschland 18/05/2007; Kempe 2007a: 62; Lindner 2007: 81-82).

A number of issues arose during the Presidency that influenced EU-Russian relations more generally. An internal EU paper prepared in advance of the Samara Summit criticised the human rights situation in Russia (Mulvey 2007). This came not long after the cases of the murdered Alexander Litvinenko and Anna Politkovskaya¹⁴, which also caused substantial discussion within the EU. In addition, Russia threatened to target missiles on Poland and the Czech Republic if they went ahead with plans to host elements of the planned US missile defence system, and to suspend the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), a key arms limitation pact (Iwanow 2007; Bacia 2007).

These events contributed to a souring of relations between the EU and Russia, and Germany (again) found itself in a difficult position (Himmelreich 2007b). On the missiles issue, Chancellor Merkel (later) managed to shuffle out of the situation by demanding that the discussions be transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kurpas and Riecke 2007: 44). As for the human rights issues however, the German Presidency had to put this on the agenda of the Summit. Here, a certain political conviction seems to have been paralleled by more sober considerations. As one official suggested, 'apart from serious concerns [with the human rights situation in Russia], we could not afford *not* to take a clear stance during the Presidency; our EU partners would

¹⁴ Alexander Litvinenko, a Russian dissident and writer, died in November 2006, of lethal polonium-210 radiation. Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist and human right activist, was shot in her apartment building in October 2006.

have not taken us seriously as a representative of EU interests in the negotiations with Russia. Also, certain groups back home expected us to take a stance' (interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 2008).

While Germany was still maintaining its (underlying) preferences (of closer economic cooperation, industrial integration, and energy security), other rational concerns became dominant during the Presidency; those of making the Presidency a success and of maximising (common) EU interests. These two were seen as closely linked with each other. Presidency success was to a great degree linked to acting as a 'skilful broker between different [Member State] interests', which was to 'enhance EU interests, because with a common unified position, the EU as a whole has more bargaining power *vis-a-vis* Russia' (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 2008). In addition, reputational concerns appear to have played a limited role at the top. One of Merkel's (close) advisors noted with regard to the Russia dossier that 'at least at the beginning of the Presidency, it seems that the Chancellor still wanted to demonstrate her European credentials a bit. She had not been on the EU stage for so long, and relations with Poland had been difficult' (interview, Chancellery, Berlin, 2008). On the official level it was noted, also with regard to the issue at hand, that 'when it is your turn to be the chair, it is also a question of some sort of peer-pressure. Your opposite-numbers envisage you to be fair, solidary and impartial overall. To go substantially or completely against that would be difficult in such a close-knit environment. As you have to work together with them also later – if there is leeway for it, or in cases of doubt about the right course of action – you give way to that [peer] pressure' (interview, Brussels, 2008).

Hence, we argue that Germany's underlying preferences were effectively constrained. This can, at least partly, be explained as a rational consideration/calculation of Presidency norms. Compliance with norms of impartiality and solidarity/consensus-building was expedient. It safeguarded Germany's broker role for later stages of the Presidency in its work on Russia and on other issues of the Presidency (such as the EU's constitutional architecture), due to diffuse long-run reputational concerns, because of slight inclinations to prove one's European credentials, and due to (feelings of) peer pressure. Another, complimentary, part of the explanation for Germany's new policy

priorities can be found in a more genuine internalisation and enactment of the Presidency norms.

3.4. A sociological institutionalist approach

From this perspective, the behaviour of governments holding the Presidency is ruled by what they think is expected of them, or by what they believe is appropriate in a given situation, rather than by cost-benefit calculations. SI thus emphasises the importance of norms and role conceptions. These mainly stem from the institution of the Presidency itself, whereby any Member State in office is expected to act in a certain way. The approach places more weight on Presidency norms influencing state behaviour than the rational choice institutionalist variant (Elgström and Tallberg 2003). Norms are complied with not out of an instrumental rationale, but because they are – following the thicker sociological variant (Lewis 2006) – truly internalised and taken for granted. Norms thus ‘constitute’ behaviour. Given strongly accepted Presidency norms such as impartiality, the sociological line of reasoning would suggest that the chair is unlikely to rigidly pursue national interests, if these are different from the EU mainstream.

The methodological challenges inherent in verifying a sociological institutionalist account are very substantial. Perhaps the main reason is that thoroughly internalised norms are hard to ascertain because actors do not really consider or discuss them as they are – being taken for granted – uncontroversial (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904).

We hold that genuine normative action did at times take place and adds to our understanding of why Germany’s underlying preferences with regard to EU-Russian relations were not (substantially) acted upon during its Presidency. Before substantiating this claim, we will briefly point out some of the processes and mechanisms of norm socialisation relevant here. The literature on norms deals especially with processes of adaptation, institutionalisation, habitualisation and persuasion (Risse and Sikkink 1999). The main idea is that increased exposure to certain (prevailing) norms fosters the likelihood of norm socialisation. Such (increased) exposure is particularly given when officials (regularly) participate in Council committees or working groups and/or when they are placed at the (German) Permanent Representation in Brussels. These

mechanisms seem to have spurred processes of adaptation and habitualisation, also with regard to the case at hand. As one German official noted, ‘witnessing expectations on the Presidency, such as impartiality in action on a weekly basis certainly triggered a more whole-hearted belief in the validity and importance of such norm than earlier, also compared to earlier times when I was involved in the Brussels arena more sporadically’ (interview, Brussels, 2008). In addition to the above-mentioned mechanisms, the Presidency has its own (in-built) socialisation function. It has been found that holding the Presidency fosters important learning process about the European dimension of policy problems and induces more ‘European thinking’ (Wurzel 1996: 272, 288; Edwards and Wallace 1977: 17; Lewis 1998: 16), a point that has been echoed by our interview partners (e.g. interview at the Chancellery, 2008). However, given its short (six month) duration the socialisation resources of the Presidency are somewhat limited.

Norm socialisation is not just about common (repeated) practices, it is also about mobilising shared values. It could be argued ‘that “socialisation leadership” is partly a question of symbolic mobilisation – about possessing and formulating symbols that can serve as points of common identification or coalitional “glue”’ (Pedersen 2003: 300). Symbolic mobilisation also seems to be relevant in the context of the German 2007 Presidency. Before its start, the federal government had decided that an important aspect of the Presidency was to let the EU speak with one voice and to ‘succeed together’ (Federal Government 2006b, Dicom Dossier 2006). The Chancellor herself was closely involved in formulating the ‘succeeding together’ *Leitmotiv*, and one source even claims that she coined the slogan herself (interview Chancellery, March 2008). The notion of the EU only being able to succeed by acting in unison – which was frequently invoked in oral and written communications (Merkel 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; Steinmeier 2007b, 2007c, 2007d) – constituted a ‘symbolic motto’ of the German Presidency. Our analysis suggests that it was also lived by a substantial fraction of those closely involved in the Presidency.

Apart from processes and mechanisms pertaining to the office of the Presidency as such, there are country specific expectations and role conceptions, which are anchored in national characteristics and past experiences (cf. Elgström 2003a: 13). Here, it seems that experiences of former German Presidencies influenced role conceptions for the 2007 Presidency. Previous German Presidencies were generally characterised by honest

brokerage and an upgrading common EU interests, and more generally a substantial determination to further the integration process (e.g. Maurer 2000; Laffan 2000; Dauderstädt and Lippert 1998). German officials involved in the Presidency felt substantial expectations – both from the outside and also within the administration – to ‘live up to the German Presidency tradition’ (interview Chancellery, 2008). Or as another official explained, ‘we were to some extent bound by the heritage of previous Presidencies. It is much easier for the French to promote their national interests during their Presidency, as they have done so quite a few times before. We have rather built a custom of remaining reticent in case of doubt’ (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Although this point is hard to substantiate empirically, it thus nonetheless seems that Germany’s 2007 Presidency behaviour to some extent also constituted a continuation of previous/existing role patterns carried by (external and self-)expectations.

There are a number of (additional) clues, signs and indications for genuine-normative action during the German Presidency concerning the Russia dossier: (1) In the first instance we conducted a number of unstructured/semi-structured interviews, in which some interviewees intimated (without prodding) that they had been acting in a genuinely normative manner. Interviewees were characterising German Presidency behaviour with regard to EU-Russian relations, for example as ‘just doing the right thing’, ‘normal conduct when you are in the Presidency role’, ‘acting along what was expected in the situation’, or emphasised that ‘as Presidency there was no question that we would help other Member States and make a step towards Poland and the Baltic countries’ without having been directly asked about it (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 2008; Chancellery 2008). While some officials indicated that cost-benefit calculations motivated (part of) Germany’s Presidency behaviour, these interviews, nevertheless, suggest that genuinely normative action did play a role here.

(2) In a second more structured part of the same (originally unstructured) interviews, officials involved in the Presidency were asked more direct questions. These included, whether they were concerned about the image of their Presidency, if they were tempted to violate norms like impartiality and solidarity/consensus-building, and how intensely (if at all) a deviation from Presidency norms was debated within relevant divisions and sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellery. Again, the

results were ‘mixed’ in terms of rationalist and sociological rationales provided. Yet, interviewees’ answers clearly indicated that some officials seem to have taken the impartiality norm for granted. These civil servants did not consider deviating from the norm in the first place, and ‘never even questioned that we needed to give an adequate voice to all Member States on the issue including Poland and find a fair outcome in EU terms, which here meant that our preferred line did not go through’ (interview Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). In addition, internal discussions also reflected genuine normative action considerably. Norms such as impartiality or solidarity ‘were often unquestioningly assumed as a “constant” so that usually they were not even thematised in meetings’ (interview, Berlin, 2008).

(3) A second set of interviews was conducted in a more structured manner. Here, interviewees were offered carefully chosen categories as a description of what was going on. Proxies for cost-benefit oriented norm compliance constituted, for example, ‘avoiding damage to one’s broker role in later stages (of the Presidency)’, ‘(diffuse) reputational concerns’, ‘preventing a (detrimental) break-down of a common EU position under one’s own Presidency’. Proxies for genuinely normative action included ‘just following what is expected of the Presidency’, ‘acting out of habit’, ‘adhering out of a sense of responsibility’. Again the outcome was varied. However, it was apparent that a substantial proportion of interviewees (also), to a considerable extent, opted for truly normatively-guided rationales. Interestingly, some officials attributed the proxies from both rationales similar values, a point that will be squared in the conclusion.

(4) Since people are often biased, interview sources were double checked against other sources. Apart from official documentation, we predominantly drew on two data sources here. First, we used ‘cross-interviews’. For example, we asked officials who were also known to have participated in meetings – particularly those that had been priorly described as not ‘thematising’ certain Presidency norms – about their characterisation of the meeting. In addition, we had limited access to some non-official records and communications.¹⁵ Here, it was possible to trace, to some extent, whether officials’ public and private views coincided. Matching public (official) and private (non-official) views

¹⁵ Given the need to respect the confidentiality of our sources, we cannot, unfortunately, be more specific here. Our sources included private notes, informal meeting summaries and unofficial correspondences.

of individuals has been held by research in political psychology to be a good indicator for revealing actors' true motivations (Smith and Mackie 2007: 312). Overall, we could confirm that a substantial majority of interviewees' statements seem to have been authentic and truthful. This, therefore, also (further) confirms our above line of argumentation concerning the not insubstantial role played by genuinely normative action for explaining why the German government revised its priorities and position on EU-Russian relations when assuming the Presidency role.

Good indicators for identifying genuinely norm-guided action thus constitute consistency and the absence of double standards. They suggest that a norm has been thoroughly internalised. □y investigating both official and non-official records and by studying the actual behaviour of the Presidency we juxtaposed, as far as possible, what actors in question said about a norm, with what they thought and did about it (cf. Nilsson 1988 for this approach).

(5) Along the same lines, if the Presidency really means a norm, it would apply it regardless of whether it concerns accommodating powerful or weak Member States. Overall, Germany often seems to have shown signs of meaning the norms. Staying with the impartiality norm, perhaps the best actor constellation on which the genuineness of impartiality can be investigated is the way that Germany treated the concerns of Poland vs. those of the allegedly less powerful Baltic states. The German government and Merkel reportedly reacted to the concerns of Poland in a similar manner than to those of Lithuania and Estonia. (cf. Federal Government 2007b, 2007d; Wetzel and Schmid 2007; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 28/3/2007, 29/3/2007). As one neutral observer described with regard to the deliberations in the Council Working Group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as Committee of Permanent Representatives, 'the [German] chairs gave ample, and I would say equal, space and opportunity to explain their difficulties and concerns with Russia and the start of the [PCA] negotiations to the respective governments. It wasn't that Poland got special treatment compared to say Estonia' (interview, Brussels, 2008). This would point to an even-handedness of the German government in terms of 'process impartiality'. But also in terms of 'outcome impartiality' (Elgström 2003b: 44-45), i.e. the fairness of results, Germany seems not to have applied doubled standards here. As one representative from one of the Baltic governments

suggested, ‘according to our judgement Steinmeier voiced our concerns just as much in his bilaterals with the Russian government in the run-up to Samara, and earlier, as those of the Polish and Czech governments’ (interview, by telephone, 2008). The gist of this statement was also confirmed by our interviews with German officials and one Russian source (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 2008; by telephone, 2008).

CONCLUSION

The above analysis suggests that *Liberal Intergovernmentalism* constitutes an adequate framework for explaining the formation of German policy preferences and positions concerning relations with Russia prior to its Presidency. As envisaged by Moravcsik, German policy goals primarily represented key producers’ interests. During its Presidency the German government gradually backed away from its ‘*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*’ approach. At the same time the preferences of German industry remained unaltered. In fact, as German governmental behaviour (after leaving the Presidency office) suggests, the ‘approach through interdependence’ strategy remained an important objective (cf. Steinmeier 2008). Throughout its Presidency other concerns and influences had entered the German interest formation process. These were related to the Presidency role, particularly the reservations of other Member States, its own expectations in terms of conducting a successful Presidency and important norms attached to the Presidency office. The German government thus ‘reprioritised’ its objectives. Such impact of (mainly informal) institutions at the cost of downplaying of domestic preferences cannot satisfactorily be captured by LI’s very thin account of institutions.

It is questionable, whether an adjustment of LI – towards a slightly thicker institutionalism – would make sense in order to increase its conceptual leverage. This would seem to contradict, to some extent, the ‘liberal’ component of Moravcsik’s three stage theory, which sees the foreign policy goals of governments to be a response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups. By amending or broadening its assumptions here, LI would risk losing some of its conceptual distinctness.

In order to adequately explain German governmental action during its Presidency we have to draw on (rational choice and sociological) institutionalist approaches. *Rational choice institutionalism* (RCI) accounts for Germany not defending its original domestic preferences by pointing to rational calculation embedded in normative constraints. Compliance with Presidency norms of impartiality and solidarity/consensus-building was deemed beneficial since it preserved Germany's mediator role for subsequent stages of the Presidency, because of diffuse long-term reputational concerns, and due to peer pressure and considerations regarding the need to demonstrate one's European credentials. *Sociological institutionalism* (SI) explains the reprioritisation of objectives mainly through the taken-for-grantedness of Presidency norms. Acting out of habit or what is considered 'normal' behaviour in a given situation thus did not allow for the pursuit of domestic interests (when differing from the EU mainstream). In addition, specific expectations and role conceptions pertaining to former German performance at the helm influence Presidency behaviour.

The above analysis has suggested that both institutional rationales have been at play here. That evidence could be found for both accounts should be further elucidated. While the two logics can be seen as competing *for the same empirical observation (and the same actor)* – since norm compliance is unlikely to occur out of habit and calculation at the same time (cf. Elgström and Tallberg 2003: 204) – otherwise RCI and SI are aptly perceived as complementary. First, SI can be seen (from a constructivist perspective) as emphasising the (preceding) factors that constitute and mould what RCI subsequently conceptualises as (exogenously) derived preferences (Ibid; Katzenstein 1996: 680). Second, different actors can act out of different logics. Third, the same people may, at different points or in different contexts, be driven by different social logics (cf. Risse 2000: 19-20; Checkel 2001: 563ff; Niemann 2004: 385ff). There may be different reasons for that. For example, agents may at different points in time be at different phases of (norm) socialisation and thus be inclined to take a certain norm for granted to varying extents (March and Olsen 1998: 953). In addition, as has been pointed out in the political psychology literature (e.g. Smith and Mackie 2007: 353ff), genuinely normative behaviour may be activated by different processes and events, including deliberate reminders or by subtle cues, which may exist to varying degrees in different situations.

It has also been found in political psychology that there is a moral dilemma between personal desires and social constraints. Norm violation only becomes possible when decision-makers have scope for interpreting norms in a manner that justifies violation as socially acceptable. Again it is emphasised that the world is not ‘either/or’ with regard to the rationalist-sociological dichotomy, ‘but reflects the tension of acting selfishly under the constraints of a social world’ (Shannon 2000: 310). The general complementarity between the two approaches is thus foremost based on contextuality. Which social logic ‘prevails’ becomes a contextual question, as each is triggered under certain conditions. In view of this paper’s focus, considering space limitations and given the potentially compromised confidentiality of (some of) our interview sources, we have to leave an analysis of the factors conditioning each logic (in the Presidency context) for future/subsequent research.

REFERENCES

- Aspinwall, M., Schneider, G. (2001) ‘Institutional research on the European Union: mapping the field’, in Aspinwall and Schneider (ed.) *The rules of integration: institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe*, pp.1-18 (Manchester University Press, Manchester).
- Bastian, K. (2006) *Die Europäische Union und Russland. Multilaterale und bilaterale Dimensionen in der Europäischen Aussenpolitik* (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden).
- Bacia, H. (2007) *Moskaus neuer rauer Ton*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 2007, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~EC64E3C27A3C346ADADCB6E1EB298188D~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html>
- Bundesregierung (2006) *Entwurf für das Arbeitsprogramm der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft 2007*, Berlin, 14 October 2006.
- Bundesregierung (2007a) *Europa gelingt gemeinsam*, Präsidentschaftsprogramm 1. Januar – 30. Juni 2007, Berlin, 14 October 2006.
- Bundesregierung (2007b) *Energy Policy for Europe during the German EU Presidency in the first half of 2007 – Position Paper of the German Government*, Berlin, November 2006.
- Büchner, G. (2007) ‘Verhandlungen EU – Russland kommen in Bewegung’, *Berliner Zeitung*, Berlin, 19 April 2007.
- Buhbe, M. (2007) ‘Grundzüge einer Russland-Strategie’, *Kompass 2020*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin.

- Checkel, J. (2001) 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change', *International Organization*, 55, pp. 53-588.
- Checkel, J. (2005) 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', *International Organization*, 59, Fall 2005, pp. 801-826.
- Council of European Union (2006) *18 Month Programme of German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies*, Brussels, 17079/06.
- Dauderstädt, M. and Lippert B. (1998) *Die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft: Doppelstrategie zu Vertiefung und Erweiterung der EU*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.
- Dauderstädt, M., Lippert, B., Mauer, A. (2007) 'Die deutsche EU Ratspräsidentschaft: Hohe Erwartungen beim engen Spielraum', *International Policy Analysis Unit*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin.
- Dempsey, J (2007) *Merkel, in Poland, seeks to bridge gap*, International Herald Tribune, available at: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/16/news/poland.php>
- Dicomm Dossier (2006) *Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007*, Beratungsgesellschaft für Politik und Kommunikation mbH, Berlin.
- Edwards, G. and Wallace, H. (1977) *The Council of Ministers of the European Community and the President in Office* (London: Federal Trust).
- Elgström, O. (2003a) 'Introduction', Elgström, O., (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 1-17 (Routledge, London).
- Elgström, O. (2003b) 'The Honest Broker? The Council Presidency as a Mediator'. In Elgström, O., (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 38-54 (Routledge, London).
- Elgström, O. (2006) 'The Presidency: The Role(s) of the Chair in European Union Negotiations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, September 2006, pp. 71-195.
- Elgström, O. and Tallberg, J. (2003) 'Rationalist and sociological perspectives on the Council Presidency' in Elgström, O., (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 191-205 (Routledge, London).
- Federal Government (2007a) *Bundesregierung für Meinungsfreiheit in Russland*, Regierung Online, 16 April 2007.
- Federal Government (2007b) *Bundeskanzlerin telefonierte mit Putin und Ansip*, Regierung Online, 28 April 2007.
- Federal Government (2007c) *Positive Bilanz der Polen Reise*, Regierung Online, 16 March 2007.
- Financial Times Deutschland (2007) *Merkel geht offen auf Konfrontationskurs zu Putin*, Hamburg, 18 May 2007.
- Financial Times Deutschland (2007) *Merkel redet Putin ins Gewissen*, Hamburg, 11 May 2007.
- Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K. (1998) 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization* 52, pp. 887-917.

- George, A.. (1979) 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison', in Lauren, Paul Gordon (ed.). *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*. New York: Free Press, pp. 43-68.
- George, A. and McKeown, T. (1985) 'Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making', *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2: 21-58.
- Grotz, C. (2005) 'Germany' in Reiche, D. (ed.) *Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union. Case study of the EU-15 states* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang).
- Haas, E.B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-7* (London: Stevens).
- Hellenbroich, E. (2007) *Deutsch-Russische Begegnungen in Wiesbaden. Anmerkungen zum 7. deutsch-russische Regierungskonsultationen*, Solons Freunde e.v, Wiesbaden, 27 October 2007.
- Herold, F. (2007) *Polen wirft Deutschland Egoismus vor*, Berliner Zeitung, Berlin, available at: <http://www.berlinonline.de/berlinerzeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2007/0315/seite1/0051/index.html>
- Himmelreich, J. (2007a) *In Favour of a Selective Partnership*, Die Berliner Republik, Berlin: The German Marshall fund of the United States.
- Himmelreich, J. (2007b) *The Ruler of the Pipeline*, Die Berliner Republik, Berlin: The German Marshall fund of the United States.
- Hoffmann, S. (1995) *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964-1994*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Iwanow, S. (2007) 'Ein unfreundliches Signal', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, München, 7 February 2007, available at: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/238/355067/text/>
- Katzenstein (1996) *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Kempe, I. (2007a) 'Eine neue Ostpolitik: Prioritäten und Realitäten der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft', in *Bilanz der deutschen EU Ratspräsidentschaft. Analyse und Bewertung des Centrums für Angewandte Politikforschung*, Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe, pp. 59-64.
- Kempe, I. (2007b) 'Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership. Notes from the 5th Roundtable' in Buhbe, M. and Nikonov, V. (eds) *Partnership with Russia in Europe. Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin, pp. 6-12.
- Kirchner, E. J. (1992) *Decision making in the European Union. The Council Presidency and European Integration*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kirchner, E.J. and Tsagkari, A. (2003), *The EC Council Presidency: the Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies*, London UACES.
- Kurpas, S. and Riecke, H. (2007) *The 2007 German EU Presidency: A Midterm Report* Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm.
- Laffan, B. (2000), 'The Agenda 2000 Negotiations: La Présidence Coute Cher?', *German Politics*, Vol.9, No.3 (December 2000), pp.1-22.
- Laumanns, U. (2005) 'Determinanten der Energiepolitik' in Reiche, D. (ed.) *Grundlagen der Energiepolitik* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang).

- Lindner, R. (2007) *Das Russland-Dossier der deutschen EU Ratspräsidentschaft: Zwischen Realinteressen und Nachbarschaftskonflikten*. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
- Lippert, B. (2007) 'EU - ENP and Russia - clash or cooperation in triangle' in Buhbe, M. and Nikonov, V. (ed.) *Partnership with Russia in Europe, Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership*, Referat Mitte und Osteuropa der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin, pp. 12-33.
- Mair S. and Perthes, V. (eds) (2006) 'Europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Aufgaben und Chancen der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft', *SWP Studie*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
- March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998) 'The institutional dynamics of international political orders', *International Organization*, 52 (4), pp. 943-969.
- Maurer, A. (2007a) 'Die Organisation widersprüchliche Erwartungen. Perspektiven für die deutsche EU Ratspräsidentschaft', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 1, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, pp. 47-65.
- Maurer, A. (2000) 'The German Presidency of the Council: Continuity or Change in Germany's European Policy?' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, pp. 44-47.
- Merkel, A. (2006) *Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel im Rahmen einer Vortragsveranstaltung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, Regierung Online, Berlin, 8 November 2006.
- Merkel, A. (2007b) *Speech by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the European Parliament in Strasbourg*, Strasbourg, 17 January 2007.
- Merkel, A. (2007c) 'Wir geben einander was', Interview with the polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 January 2007.
- Merkel, A (2007d) 'Interview Transcript: Angela Merkel', *Financial Times Deutschland*, 6 March 2007.
- Merkel, A. and Barosso, J. (2006) *Pressstatement von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem Präsidenten der EU-Kommission Jose Barosso*, Berlin, 11 October 2006.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006a) *Beziehungen der EU zur RUS*, Internal Document, Berlin.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006b) *Document written by the Planungsstab*, Internal Document, Berlin.
- Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'Preferences and power in the European Community. A liberal Intergovernmentalist approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31, 4, pp. 473-524.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997) 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization*, 51, pp. 513-553.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Mulvey, S. (2007) *Sticky Issues for EU-Russia Summit*, BBC News, 18 May 2007, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665309.stm>

- Niemann, A. (2004) 'Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 Committee and the negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 379-407.
- Niemann, A. (2006) *Explaining Decisions in the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Nilsson, A.S. (1988) 'Political Interpretations of International Legal Norms', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 23 (2), pp.163-177.
- Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (2006a) *Die Deutsch-Russische Wirtschaftsbeziehung, Deutsche Unternehmen bauen Engagement aus*, Positionspapier (stand Oktober 2006), Berlin.
- Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (2006b) *Deutsche Unternehmen bauen Russland- Engagement aus. Stand der deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*, München.
- Paterson, W. (2006) 'Germany, the European Union and the G8 Presidencies. Leading the Leaderless', *The World Today*, Vol. 62, No. 12, London: Chatham House.
- Risse, T. (2000) "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization* 54. pp. 1-39.
- Sander, M (2007) 'A "strategic relationship"? The German Policy of Energy Security within the EU and the importance of Russia' in Overhaus, M., Maull, H. and Harnisch S (eds) *Dealing with Dependency. The European Union's Quest for a Common Energy Foreign Policy*, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol.8, Issue 20, pp. 16-24.
- Schout, A. (1998) 'The Presidency as a Juggler', *Eipiascope 2*, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- Schuller, K. (2007) 'Merkel in Warschau „Wir deuten die Geschichte nicht um“', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 March 2007, available at: <http://www.faz.net/IN/INtemplates/faznet/default.asp?tpl=common/zwischeneseite.asp&dox={E86C262E-2FED-447B-1CC4-2FB6E31C7684}&rub={DDBDABB9-457A-437B-AA85-A49C26FB23A0}>
- Silberberg, R. (2006) *Ausblick auf die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft: Stand der Vorbereitung in der Bundesregierung*, Berlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Singhofen, S.C. (2007) *Deutschland und Russland zwischen Strategischer Partnerschaft und neuer Konkurrenz. Ein Vorschlag für die Praxis*, Arbeitspapier, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin/Sankt-Augustin.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2006a) *Internationale Aspekten der Energiepolitik*, Speech by Steinmeier at the Second Energy Summit of the Federal Government, 9 October 2006.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2006b) *Außenpolitik im Zeichen von Energiesicherung*, Interview mit Bundesaußenminister im rbb-Inforadio, Berlin, 14 October 2006.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2006c) *Europas Agenda: Aussenpolitische Schwerpunkte der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft*, Berlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2007) 'Verflechtung und Integration. Eine neue Phase der Ost-Politik der EU: nicht Abgrenzung sondern Vernetzung lautet das Gebot der Globalisierung', *Internationale Politik*, March, pp. 6-11.

- Steinmeier, F.W. (2007b) *Europas Agenda: Aussenpolitische Schwerpunkte der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft*, Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier auf der COFACC, Berlin, 26 February 2007.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2007c) *Rede von Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier zur Berliner Erklärung vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg*, Straßburg, 14 March 2007.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2007d) 'Wir wollen kein neues Wettrüsten', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, Frankfurt, 18 March 2007.
- Steinmeier, F.W. (2008) *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Ostpolitik. Die Beziehungen Deutschland und den östlichen Nachbarn*, Speech at the Willy-Brandt Stiftung, 03 April 2008.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (2007) *Krawalle in Estland. Putin bittet Merkel um Hilfe*, München, 28 April 2007.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (2007) *Krise Zwischen Russland und Estland. Sowjetdenkmal wird an anderem Ort aufgebaut*, München, 29 April 2007.
- Tallberg, J. (2003) 'The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10, 1, pp. 1-19.
- Tallberg, J. (2004) 'The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (5), pp. 999–1022.
- Tallberg, J. (2006) *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union* (Cambridge University Press).
- Timmerman, H. (2007) 'Die deutsch – russische Beziehungen im Europäische Kontext', *Internationale Politik*, 1, pp. 101-122.
- Tönjes, C. (2007) 'Duits Energiebeleid in 2007', *Internationale Spectator*, Den Haag, Clingendael Instituut, pp. 30-33.
- Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC', *Millenium*, 20, pp. 1-22.
- Wetzel, H., Schmid, F. (2007) 'Schwere Krise zwischen EU und Russland', *Financial Times Deutschland*, Hamburg, 03 May 2007.
- Wurzel, R.K.W. (1996) 'The role of the EU Presidency in the environmental field: does it make a difference which member state runs the Presidency?', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 3(2), pp. 272–91.
- Zagorsky, A. (2007) 'Common European Neighbourhood and the Post Soviet Space' in Buhbe, M. and Nikonov, V. (ed.) *Partnership with Russia in Europe. Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership*, Referat Mitte und Osteuropa der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin, pp. 36-50.