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MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND DOPING CULTURES IN SPORT

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Summary

In this article, the fight against doping has been analyzed as an ongoing process of social definition. It is dependent on the development of power relations within and outside the world of sport. To analyze these dependencies, I identified a variety of important doping cultures in sport and studied the development of the power relations between the supporters of these cultures during the second half of the twentieth century. Doping culture is defined as the typical attitudes and practices relating to doping within a sector of the world of sport. I distinguish an official Olympic doping culture and more secret cultures in cycling, weightlifting, track and field and American professional team sports. I analyzed how the Olympic battle against doping became integrated in the American “War on Drugs”. The relevance of discussing doping in terms of doping cultures is that drug use should not be considered simply as an act of individual cheating, but as an institutionalized activity in certain sectors of sport. The existence of a culture presupposes a certain degree of organization of its participants. Those who wish to fight doping in sports should try to attack this organization. They should not just test individual athletes for doping. On top of this they should look for those who produce and distribute the drugs and those who teach the athletes to use them.

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INTRODUCTION

In this article I analyze a variety of social definitions of the use of performance enhancing drugs in sport (doping) and the interactions between the supporters of these definitions. I will analyze the sector of organized sport in which objections against doping were first defined, and how this definition competed with different views in other sectors of the world of sport and the wider society. To understand this competition and the resultant social definitions of doping, it must be situated in the broader context of the international development of the position and meaning of sport in modern societies.

I concentrate on these competing definitions and not on the actual results of the battle against doping. There are no methods to count the number of doping users (Yesalis a.o., 2001, 56). However, it would be naïve to maintain that there is no increase in the use of doping. That is a result of: 1) the availability of new hard to detect drugs, 2) the desire of athletes to improve their performances, 3) commercial and political pressures on the athletes and, according to Todd, 4) the lack of commitment by sport officials to effectuate foolproof doping tests (Todd 2001: p. 109). This observation of Todd was confirmed in 2003. In that year documents became publicly available that showed the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) had not followed its own rules after athletes had tested positive for doping. Out of more than 100 athletes who tested positive between 1988 and 2000, only a few were barred from competition and 19 went on to win medals. Among them was the famous Olympic sprint and long jump champion Carl Lewis (Sportsillustrated.cnn.com 23/4/'03).

The typical attitudes and practices relating to doping within a sector of the world of sport I call its doping culture. This use of the concept of culture is derived from Howard Becker's work on labeling theory (Becker, 1973, p. 80). The purpose of this article is twofold. I want to demonstrate how prevailing social definitions of doping in international sports depended on the international prestige of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and on the development of international relations. Secondly, I argue that doping should not be considered simply as an act of individual cheating, but as a form of participation in a culture specific to a particular sector of the sport world at a certain time and place. I consider this argument as a stronger version of Waddington's proposition that "at the elite level it is simply unrealistic to see the individual drug-using athlete as working alone, without the assistance and support of others" (Waddington, 2000, p. 159). For those who are involved in the battle against doping this means they should not only concentrate on the pursuit of individual violators. They must realize that they are confronted with cultural embedded practices.

The whole network in a sport sector that supports a certain drug culture should be the object of measures in the fight against doping, not just the individual athletes.

During the 1960s and 1970s many interesting studies of deviant behavior were based on labeling theory: the study of the social reaction to deviant behavior and its consequences for the individuals and groups who were labeled as deviant (Becker, 1973; Scheff, 1966; Lemert, 1951). The central point of labeling theory is that the sociologist should study all those involved in an act of alleged deviance (Becker, 1973, p.183). The attitudes and activities of the people and organizations that define certain acts as deviant have to be studied, as well as the "deviant" actors themselves. This point is especially important for the subject of this paper. Generally, doping is studied from an anti-doping perspective. For example, most of the contributors to the important book *Doping in Elite sport* (2001) share the conviction that "doping in sport is pernicious and should be policed" (Wilson and Derse eds., 2001, p. XIII). In this article the origins and development of this conviction is a subject of inquiry.

Labeling theorists use the concept of "moral entrepreneurs" to identify persons and organizations that take the initiative to define certain forms of behavior as deviant and reprehensible (Becker, 1973, p.147). Differences in the ability to make rules and apply them to other people are essentially considered as power differentials (Becker, 1973, p.17). However, labeling theorists do not study the power relations between the moral entrepreneurs and the people whose actions they try to define as deviant. In this article I study these power relations on the basis of figurational sociology. Figurational sociologists share with labeling theorists the idea that one should study all those involved in an act of alleged deviance. However, they accentuate the power relations between the actors. For figurational sociologists, power is not only based on property, but on any resource for which one partner in a relationship is dependent upon the individual or group that controls that resource (Elias, 1970, p.97). Secondly, figurational sociologists emphasize the changing nature of power relations in societies. Each social relation is characterized by a certain balance of power between the actors in the relation. In the enduring universal process of social change, some actors will obtain more or new sources of power and others will see their power diminishing. This results in changes in power balances (Elias, 1970, p.82).

I will analyze first how the IOC as a moral entrepreneur reacted to doping, and took measures to control and prevent it. Then I analyze how the IOC's definition competed with rival definitions in other sectors of organized sport. The nature of the power relations between the IOC and the other

sectors determined how doping was defined and which measures were taken to control it. These power relations themselves changed with the evolution of the position and meaning of sport in society. Especially since the last decade of the twentieth century, one can observe significant changes in the power relations in international sport. Their consequences for the battle against doping will be dealt with in the last section.

METHODS

To understand how the IOC came to define its position on performance enhancing drugs I studied the minutes of the meetings of the IOC, its Executive Committee and the Medical Commission and the correspondences and documents used in connection with these meetings. From these documents it is possible to establish a clear view of the development of the position of the IOC towards drugs. In the archival material there are also a few indications of the IOC's relationship with other sectors of organized sports. However, most of the information on these sectors is based on secondary literature and documents found on the Internet.

During a stay in Lausanne, I conducted a lengthy interview (three hours) about drugs in cycling with both the president of the International Cyclist Union (ICU) and a lawyer who represents the ICU in the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA). This conversation verified my understanding of the position of the ICU gained from the literature.

THE IOC AND DOPING

Until the 1960's, doping was defined as one of the problems in the relation between amateurs and professionals. Within the IOC, professional sport was seen as a degraded form of sport, sharp in contrast with amateur sport that claimed to serve the "betterment of mankind" (Dyreson, 1998, p.39). Doping was associated with these professionals. Since the IOC wanted to keep the Olympics exclusive for amateurs, it felt obliged to battle all forms of behavior associated with professionalism, inclusive doping.

The origin of control for doping lies outside the sports connected with the Olympic games. Around the turn to the twentieth century in a professional sport with strong gambling connections - horse racing – doping became a controversial issue. It was considered unfair to gamblers who had no knowledge about which horses were doped. The English Jockey Club prohibited doping in 1903. In 1910 a test was developed to detect the most common drugs given to horses, and since 1930 drug

testing in horse racing has been introduced for all races organized in the framework of the International Horse Racing Organization (Schaepdrijver and Hebbelink, 1965, p. 67).

In other sports no objections were raised before the 1930s. Yet it is known that long before the 1930s athletes tried to enhance their performances with all kinds of drugs and other artificial means. We miss systematic historical research but my impression is in agreement with the statement of Yesalis a.o.:

During the 19th century, performance-enhancing drug use among athletes was commonplace. Swimmers, distance runners, sprinters, and cyclists used drugs such as caffeine, alcohol, nitroglycerine, digitalis, cocaine, strychnine, ether, opium, and heroin in attempts to gain a competitive edge on their opponents (Yesalis a.o., 2001, p. 43).

During the 1930s the biological value and ethics of administering extra oxygen and the use of ultra violet light sources to invigorate athletes were much debated issues (Hoberman, 1992, p.103). In that period the issue of doping slowly emerged on the agenda of the IOC. The first objection to doping in amateur sports that history records was made in 1933 in a report by Paul Rousseau, a member of the French National Olympic Committee. He considered the use of doping by amateur athletes at the Olympic games of 1932 as one of the signs of dishonesty in sport. Doping was defined as counter to the high ideals associated with amateur sports, especially amateur sports at the Olympics.

Les piqûres intra-musculaires ont sévi, les inhalations d'oxygène aussi. Tous ces procédés sont-ils dignes de véritables athlètes dans le sens le plus élevé du mot? Est-ce la ce que l'on a voulu? Nous ne le croyons pas (Rousseau. Brochure 1933. CIO, Vienne 1933).

(Injections are given and also oxygen inhalations. Are all these actions worthy for true athletes in the most elevated sense of the word? Is this what one has wanted. We do not think so) (Trans. R.S.)

During the meeting of the IOC in 1937, drugs were discussed. The chairman of the IOC at that time, Baillet Latour, commented:

Le sport amateur ayant pour objet l'amélioration de la race humaine, rien ne doit être négligé pour combattre par tous les moyens possibles l'usage du doping, qui est la ruine de la santé et la certitude d'une mort prématurée. Quels moyens préconisez vous? (CIO, Varsovie 1936-1937).

(Since amateur sport has as its object the betterment of the human race, nothing should be neglected to combat with all possible means the use of drugs, which ruin the health and give the certainty of premature death. What do you advice?) (Trans. R.S.).

A year later the IOC decided that athletes using drugs should not be allowed to participate in competitions of amateurs. But an official rule did not follow on this decision. It took more than twenty years and three Olympics (London 1948, Helsinki 1952 and Melbourne 1956) before doping again became an issue for the IOC.

An organization of medical doctors connected with sports, the Fédération Internationale Médecine-Sportive (FIMS), founded in 1928 (Waddington, 1996, p.177), did not consider doping an important issue before the 1960s. In 1962, when the IOC had already been confronted with the drug-related death of a Danish cyclist during the Olympics in Rome, the officials of the FIMS spent their time organizing a large survey to investigate the characteristics of top athletes. Its purpose was:

to develop a body of knowledge related to their high level of physical fitness, which could be of value in bettering the health of mankind generally. (FIMS, 1950-1963).

Avery Brundage, then chairman of the IOC, was very interested in this project. In a letter to a board member of a commission of the FIMS, Brundage proposed to add to the survey the social and psychological characteristics of the top athletes (Brundage, letter 12/7/63. FIMS, 1963). This indicates that even during the first part of the 1960s, doping was not considered a major problem in Olympic sports. Yet, it was getting some consideration from the IOC. The way doping became a problem for the IOC is made clear in a letter from its chancellor Otto Mayer to the secretary-general of FIMS:

Puisque l'occasion m'est donnée, pourrais-je insister sur le problème du DOPING qui, chaque jour prend une extension grandissante. Ce véritable fléau doit être combattu avec énergie. (FIMIS, 1950-1963, letter Mayer, 25/11/61).

(Because I have the opportunity, can I stress the problem of DOPING, that each day enlarges? This true plague has to be combated with energy) (Trans. R.S.)

A few months later, a sub-commission to consider doping was established by the Executive Board of the IOC. Its chairman was Sir Arthur Porritt, a well-known British doctor. (E.B.Lausanne, 2/3/62). In 1965 this sub-commission published its policy report.

To understand why it took three years before the sub-commission produced a report, the organizational capabilities of the IOC as a moral entrepreneur must be considered (Chandler, 1990). The IOC did not have a management hierarchy or staff members to execute new tasks. Porritt was a busy doctor, interested in sports medicine as a hobby. This lack of organizational capabilities on the part of the anti-doping forces is, as I will later explain, characteristic of the battle against drugs in sport during the next thirty years. In Porritt's report, doping was primarily associated with professional sports. According to the author, the public asked sensational performances of these athletes, and they could earn money and fame. However, he had to admit, sadly enough many cases of the use of drugs among amateurs were also known. The report considered doping still in terms of the great split in sport between amateurs and professionals. However, Porritt also went further. For the first time the now well-known arguments against the use of doping were summarized, as well as the measures described to fight its use. Doping was considered bad for the health of athletes, its use would give unfair advantages and it would be a bad example for the young when their sport heroes used drugs. Porritt proposed an educational program to warn against doping, rules in each sport to forbid its use and a system to control athletes for doping (CIO-Bulletin, no 90, 15/5/65).

It took another two years before the first systematic experiment with doping control associated with Olympic sports was set up. That was in 1967, during an international pre-Olympic competition in Mexico, the city of the Olympic games of 1968. In evaluating the effectiveness of the doping tests, again the lack of organizational capabilities manifested itself. There was no adequate accommodation for the athletes to produce their urine for the testers. In some cases it was necessary to wait three hours before an athlete was able to urinate. It was not always easy to find the athletes immediately after they had competed; sometimes it took more than 20 minutes to locate them. Another point was that the IOC knew that steroids were being used. But there did not exist any test to identify the presence of steroids in the body (IOC 65th session, Teheran 1967).

The lack of organizational capabilities was also demonstrated by the misunderstandings created by Avery Brundage about which organization was actually responsible for the drug testing during the Olympics of 1968. According to Brundage, in the Olympics the actual execution of the

tests should be handled by the international sports federations¹ and not by the IOC (CIO, letter Brundage 9/8/68). These federations were also responsible for the actual execution of the competitions. But this was not what Prince de Mérode, the successor of Porritt in 1967, had intended. He believed the Medical Commission of the IOC should supervise and regulate the testing procedures (CIO, letter de Mérode, 10/9/68). Brundage did agree, but he maintained that the international federations remained responsible for the actual testing of their athletes. (CIO, letter Brundage, 14/9/68). So it remained undecided what would happen with the athletes from federations that had did not test their athletes.

Another sign that drugs were considered more as an irritating disturbance than a major problem was the association of testing for doping with control for femininity². At the meeting of the executive board of the IOC in Mexico where the Medical Commission presented its plans for testing for doping and femininity, this second point took most of the attention of the board. (E.B.Grenoble 5/2/68; Todd, 1987, p. 96).

During the 1960s, also outside the IOC doping was not yet considered a major threat to the integrity of the games. In his 1964 PhD dissertation, *Werte, Ziele, Wirklichkeit der modernen Olympischen Spiele*, the former Olympic rower Hans Lenk presented a detailed overview of all the problems connected with the Olympic games. Doping was treated in a few sentences under the heading of "health damages", and it was not even called a problem. Under the heading, "disallowed means", there is no discussion of doping.

This "irritating disturbance", this "fléau" (plague) (as Otto Mayer correctly foresaw) grew into a major problem for the international prestige and continuity of the Olympics. But for a long time it was considered mainly a plague in relation to the ideals of amateurism. Even in 1976 the then chairman of the IOC, Lord Killanin, considered the rule against doping as part of the rules on "eligibility and amateurism" (Killanin and Rodda, 1976, p.152).

¹ On the national level each branch of sport is organized by a national organization and on the international level by an international organization.

The IOC is responsible for the organization of the Olympic Games. National Olympic Committees (NOC) in each national state are responsible for the preparation and selection of athletes that participate in the Olympic Games. In some countries the NOC is merged with a national organization that coordinates the activities of the national organizations for each branch of sport.

² During the Olympic Games of 1960 and 1964 suspicions had been raised about the sexual status of some of the successful woman athletes. It was thought that they might have many physical characteristics considered as typical for woman, but because of chromosome abnormalities had the physical advantages of males (Killanin and Rodda 1976:p.170).

After 1968, the organizational requirements for testing for doping were gradually realized. In 1974 it became possible to test for steroids, and all over the world a number of officially recognized testing laboratories were established. The IOC did not finance these laboratories, but they could obtain an official accreditation by the Medical Commission for drug testing. However, to curb the use of steroids effectually it would be necessary to test athletes regularly during their training period, because one did not have to take steroids during competitions to profit from their use. This theme of "out-of-competition testing" was for the first time discussed officially during the World Conference against Doping of 1989. During the 1990s occasional forms of out-of-competition testing were organized. A worldwide organization to effect this, the World Anti-Drug Agency (WADA) was set up only in 1999.

Why did it take so long before out-of-competition testing was considered? To organize a system of out-of-competition testing for all Olympic sports in all countries of the world was clearly asking too much of the organizational capabilities of the IOC. The IOC attempted to control its own event, the Olympics, but could not regularly control all athletes in all sports across the globe on a permanent basis. The personnel for the control on drugs at the Olympics grew from a small number in 1968 to an organization employing 400 people at the Olympic games in Sydney (IOC Medical Commission, 2000). The financial means for out-of-competition testing only became available after the games of 1984, when the organizers demonstrated that it was possible to organize the games and reap financial profit. However, organizational capabilities are not only related to finance, but it also depends on the determination of an organization to react appropriately to a challenge.

The Cold War influenced the determination of the IOC to fight drugs in several ways. More than ever, performances in sports, especially during the Olympics, carried a strongly political message. They became symbols for the superiority of capitalist and communist countries. This must have stimulated the use of doping as well as a desire to control its use (Stokvis, 2000, p.431; Waddington, 1996, p.185). However, the Cold War also divided the IOC. As early as 1961, Avery Brundage signaled this division of the IOC in two blocs. According to him, all communist countries always supported all the proposals of the USSR (E.B. Athens 18/6/61). In 1968, this division in two blocs became an issue within the medical commission. At that time a French doctor protested that he had to leave his position in the commission to make room for representatives of the USA and the USSR:

Doctor Thiébault replied that he considered this decision a wrong one, in that two blocs have been invited more for reasons of balance than for their prior experience in, for example, the campaign against doping. (M.C. Mexico, 12/10/68).

At the end of the discussion the doctor was asked to remain in the commission because of his expertise. However, a balance between the two blocs became a basic assumption of the commission. In the name of the ideals of amateur sports, the IOC and its medical commission tried to control the use of drugs. Yet, it was never possible to fight its use seriously, because if suspicions were raised against athletes from one of the ideological blocs, all the partners of that bloc would help to prevent measures that damaged the prestige of their side. Now that we know about the state-supported program of drugs in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)³ and the USSR (and probably in other former communist countries, too), and the communist states' control of their sports officials, it is no wonder that only after the Soviet bloc disintegrated the fight against drugs was intensified and out-of-competition testing introduced.

For the greater part of the 20th century the IOC was an organization for amateur sport, governed by amateur officials. Within this organization doping was defined as an infraction on the ethics of amateur sport. The IOC missed the organizational capabilities to test athletes effectually for the use of doping. For a long time the split between communist and capitalist countries formed an extra barrier for effective testing.

COMPETING SOCIAL DEFINITIONS OF DOPING

A few decades after its foundation in 1894, the IOC, as the governing body of the Olympic movement, had become a highly respected organization. Its president mixed with heads of states on

³ The communist government of the GDR defined the Olympics as an arena in which they could demonstrate the success of their regime for an international public (Ungerleider, 2001, p.45). In the GDR it was considered proper by the state authorities, sports officials, and trainers to give doping to athletes (Spitzer, 1998, p. 123). The use of doping by athletes of the GDR can be considered a form of state-supported doping culture (Berendonk, 1992, p. 108, 243). One question is how the athletes themselves may have felt about doping. Spitzer just found two clear cases of firm refusals by athletes to take doping (Spitzer, 1998, pp 158-163, 353). Athletes over eighteen were told they received "performance-enhancement supplements" and were verbally pledged to silence by their trainers (Ungerleider, 2001, p.87). Even if they complained after dissolution of the GDR, this does not mean that they did not cooperate voluntarily when they were active athletes (Berendonk, 1992, p. 102). Many of the former GDR coaches easily got jobs in other countries. Several of these coaches went to China for extensive periods. Not long after their stay, especially in swimming, the Chinese became very successful, but many swimmers also tested positive for anabolic steroids. Of the 58 positive tests in swimming in 1998, China accounted for 29 of those positive tests (Leonard 2001: 226)

equal terms. Yet the IOC never represented organized sport in its entirety. The moral indignation about doping that inspired the policies of the IOC was not universally and not uniformly shared in the world of sport. Till the end of 20th century a number of alternative social definitions of doping remained in existence. High performance sport should not be considered as a "global monoculture" (Kidd a.o., 2001, p.182). In general, no more than twenty branches of sport were represented in the IOC. Moreover, from a number of sports (cycling, boxing, soccer, basketball) only the less prestigious amateur sections actually participated. In spite of its universal pretensions, the IOC ruled over one sector of the world of organized sport, it had no powers outside its domain. Other sectors, especially those of professional sports that functioned independently of the Olympics, were not affected by the IOC's rulings. In these sectors, the views on doping used to be more liberal than those of the IOC.

Professional cycling

For a long time, professional cycling was largely a Western and Southern European sport, which was organized independent from the authority of the IOC. Within professional cycling the cultural meaning of doping traditionally was completely different from its meaning in the circles of Olympic amateur sports officials. In Western Europe professional cycling was considered a lower class sport, a world of its own that had nothing to do with the high ideals of the Olympics. In the early debates on doping it was considered the negative example par excellence. Rousseau (1933) as well as Porritt (1965) meant professional cyclists when they associated doping with professionalism. And indeed, doping had a different meaning in professional cycling. Its use was considered more or less normal. In his book on the Giro of Italy of 1949 the journalist Dino Buzzatti writes frankly about the preparations of the caretakers (soigneurs) for the cyclists and the "dynamic mixtures" they prepared for them (Buzzatti, 1990, p. 33). During the 1960's, Dutch medical doctors associated with professional cycling had no objections to drugs. What they objected to was that people with no medical training, the caretakers, handed prescription drugs to cyclists and injected them. The doctors wanted to provide the drugs to the athletes themselves (Stokvis, 2000, p. 435).

In 1963, the Council of Europe agreed on a convention against the use of performance enhancing drugs in sport. It asked the sport organizations to take measures to control the use of

doping. If the organizations would not act properly it was agreed that the governments themselves would take appropriate measures (Council of Europe, 1963). France and Belgium introduced anti-doping laws in 1965, because their national cyclists associations had not been very active in prohibiting doping and controlling its use. In 1966, as a consequence of this law in France, participants in the Tour de France were suddenly checked for doping. The indignation among the cyclists led them to strike on the day following the checks. They called it "inhuman" treatment of the cyclists (Stokvis, 2000, p.435). Following the incident of 1966, the laws were not applied for a long time. The sanctions against famous cyclists that were caught for using drugs did not have any severe consequences for their careers in cycling and did not undermine their popularity as sportsmen (Maso, 1990, p. 197).

In 1989, the Council of Europe agreed on a new "anti-doping convention". In that year France introduced a new law against doping. But only in 1998, following the discovery of great quantities of drugs used to enhance performance, did the French police carry out a sudden check on the basis of the new law. And again it was followed by a strike by the cyclists and cries of inhuman treatment.

It is evident that in professional cycling a culture exists where doping is accepted. I would not call this culture a "culture of tolerance" (Waddington, 2000, p 155). In cycling, doping is not considered a deviant act that is tolerated. It is a normal act in the culture of professional cyclists (Brewer 2002: 285). This doping culture dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. In that period cycling became a lower class sport connected with large commercial interests (Rabenstein 1998, p. 121). Because this "cultural element" has positive functions (Waddington, 2000, p.160) for many cyclists, it is difficult to eliminate. An individual cyclist who uses doping should not be considered as a cheat, it is a participant in a specific doping culture. Officials and organizers of cycling events, obliged to fight doping to satisfy IOC-officials, politicians and the press, silently accommodate to this culture. Generally, the view on doping by officials of the international cyclist union has been more liberal and open than that of most other sports organizations (Stokvis, 2000, p.436).

Bodybuilding and weightlifting

Many people engage in bodybuilding without competitive intentions. It is an activity generally organized in private gyms. According to American bodybuilders, the American Anabolic Steroid

Control Act of 1990, which forbids the use of steroids, was intended to prevent "cheating" in competitive sports, but this law also prevents them from improving "the way that they look", and this should not be the case (Collins, 1999, p.15). Collins can be considered as the spokesmen of all those men who are so intensely concerned with their bodies that physicians characterized their concern as symptom of an "Adonis complex". According to these physicians, this complex touches millions of boys and men in one form or another (Pope a.o., 2000, p.7). Most forms of training in bodybuilding imply the use of steroids (Koert, 1998, p. 278). Simply entering "steroids" into an Internet search engine like Yahoo yields a virtual view of the scale of the culture of drugs in bodybuilding. This virtual world offers many easily accessible entrees into the use of steroids in real life, such as ways of obtaining steroids, quality tests, and schemes for the effective use of the products. It is evident that the world of bodybuilding has a doping culture of its own that differs sharply from other sectors in the world of sport.

It is questionable whether one should consider bodybuilding a branch of sport at all. It is certainly not an Olympic sport. It is a practice that developed completely outside and independently from the Olympic movement (Chapman, 1994). Yet in America, bodybuilding developed alongside the Olympic sport of weightlifting, especially in the famous York Barbell Club. From 1936 till 1960 weightlifters of this club won golden medals at the Olympics. Till the seventies its bodybuilders dominated the Mr. America and Mr. Universe competitions. In this club experiments with steroids began in 1954 (Fair, 1999, p. 159). During the sixties according to one witness:

The York men went crazy about steroids. They figured if one pill was good, three or four would be better, and they were eating them like candy (Fair, 1999, p. 233)

As can be seen in Table 1 (below), 44% of the athletes caught for using doping are weightlifters. In this *Olympic* sport a specific doping culture developed in which doping was considered as acceptable. Like cyclists, weightlifters caught for using doping, should not be considered as individual cheats, they are participants in a specific doping culture.

Strength athletics

In spite of the official ban on doping by the IOC, in athletics (track and field), the major Olympic sport, a secret doping culture developed. During the 1950s, the use of steroids entered Olympic amateur sports via weightlifting. American athletes were quick to follow their Russian counterparts

(Todd, 1987, p 94; Hoberman, 1992, p. 266). The use of steroids successfully helped to build up muscles. Thus, it was also useful in other sports activities where muscle mass played a decisive role for performance, such as the shot-put, discus, hammer, and javelin throwing, as well as wrestling and sprint. These sports were part of the Olympic program and participants had to subject themselves to the rulings of the IOC. The support of their governments protected doping-using athletes from communist countries in two ways from the control measures of the IOC. Scientists helped the athletes to hide their use of doping and officials interfered with the attempts to control for drugs. It was hardly a surprise that during the Olympic games of 1980 in Moscow no athletes tested positive for doping (table 1). Athletes from other countries used doping as well, however they had to organize it more for themselves and were less well protected by their officials.

From the record of Olympic athletes caught using doping one easily gets the impression that their use was an individual affair. Moreover, because of the secrecy surrounding doping in sport, it is nearly impossible to provide convincing evidence of the existence of drug cultures in certain branches of sport. This raises a methodological problem. If one can only observe incidental individual athletes who are tested positive for drugs, can one conclude from this evidence that drug use in sport is an affair limited to a small number of cheating individuals? This conclusion is not well founded, because we do not know what happens in secret. However, the alternative conclusion, that in a number of Olympic sports doping is culturally embedded, is nearly impossible to prove. It would require a form of longtime participant observation, as anthropologist use to do. I can only provide some circumstantial evidence in support of this alternative conclusion.

Table 1: Official number of doping cases at Olympic games, specified for weightlifting and athletics⁴

	Weightlifting	Athletic s	Other sports	Total
1968	-	-	1	1
1972	2	-	5	7
1976	8	1	2	11
1980	-	-	-	-

⁴ I consider this remarkable small number of official cases only as a reflection of the *relative* frequency of the use of doping in different Olympic sports. In 1998, just in swimming, there had been 58 positive tests for doping (Leonard, 2001, 226)

1984	5	3	4	12
1988	5	1	4	10
1992	-	4	1	5
1996	?	?	?	(2)
2000	4	2	5	11
Total	24	11	22	57 +(2)

Source: IOC, Medical Commission (www.nodoping.olympic.org)

On the admittedly questionable basis of the Olympic athletes that were caught using drugs, a first indication for the existence of a doping culture in athletics (track and field) is that a relative large number can be found in strength sports (table 1); 44% of the positive cases are from weightlifting and 19% from athletics. The remaining 18 to 20 Olympic sports account for 37% of the positive cases. The difference in the number of positive cases between weightlifting and athletics is probably due to the fact that weightlifting is a rather marginal sport not able to recruit enough scientific support to hide the use of drugs by its athletes. The major argument to assume the existence of a secret culture of the use of steroids in track and field is that many athletes used steroids during the time these drugs were not officially banned, because they could not be detected. As early as 1956 the Czechoslovakian Olympic female discus champion Olga Fikotova complained that anabolic steroids would change the nature of track and field competition (Wadler, US Senate, 20/10/99). Her husband, 1956 Olympic hammer throwing champion Harold Connolly, stated to a US Senate Committee in 1973:

I knew any number of athletes in the 1968 Olympic team who had so much scar tissue and so many puncture holes on their backsides that it was difficult to find a fresh spot to give them a new shot. (Beckett, in Killanin and Rodda, 1976, p. 167).

Testing for steroids became possible after 1974. In 1975 they were included on the list of banned drugs (Beckett, 1976, p. 168). Yet, for a long time testing for steroids remained ineffectual because athletes could stop using them some weeks before an event, while its performance enhancing effect remained. During competitions athletes could profit from use of the drug without it actually being present in their bodies. Only incompetent users, those who could not count on the science-based

support of their government or sport organization, could be caught through testing. It was at the end of the twentieth century that unannounced checks outside of competitions became somewhat more effective (Zorpette, 2000, p.6). At present, as out-of-competition testing is becoming more institutionalized, new strategies are being designed to prevent detection. Athletes try to avoid training at places where they expect unannounced checks (Zorpette, 2000, p.10).

American professional team sports

The major American professional sports, such as football, basketball, baseball and hockey do function completely independent from the Olympic movement. In these sports, the United States is a veritable world on its own, with some minor involvement of Canada. The Americans consider national championships in these professional team sports as world championships. Players and officials have to deal only with the rules of their national organizations and those of the American government. Attitudes and practices toward doping in these sport developed independently from the Olympic movement (Todd, 1987, p.101). Unlike the athletes in many other sports, these professional team players recognize that what they do is a “business” (Beamish, 1993, p.204). This state of affairs has interesting consequences for the view on doping in American sociological literature. In one of the best introductions in the sociology of sport, Jay Coakley's *Sport in Society*, doping is dealt with nearly exclusively as a problem in Olympic sports. Coakley does not analyze the well-known widespread use of doping in American professional and Division I collegiate sports (Coakley, 1998, p.166-176).

For a long time the use of doping in American team sports has been a common practice. During the 1970s, many football players took amphetamines (Underwood, 1979, pp. 71-88). In 1976 Michener wrote:

The evidence is overwhelming that teams on all levels have been either encouraging their players to hype themselves with drugs, or refusing to acknowledge that it is being done surreptitiously (Michener, 1976. p. 565).

It was in 1990 that the American government definitively prohibited prescription of steroids to healthy people. In Europe this had been the case already much earlier. Till that time, in most American states, the use of anabolic steroids was not controlled and punished in these national team

sports⁵. In 1990, the Anabolic Steroids Control Act made it a felony to sell steroids for non-medical uses on pain of five years in jail. But the restrictions of this law changed with the adoption of another law: The Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act of 1994. This law stated that because they are no longer classified as foods, the law of 1990 was not applicable to many products sold over the counter as nutritional supplements. Some of these products contained steroids. As a result, in 1998, after the famous baseball player Mark McGwire admitted that he used a food supplement with a relative weak steroid in it (androstenedione), the next year sales of the supplement quintupled (The Salt Lake Tribune, 16/1/2000). Hoberman concluded for the USA:

The media coverage of the McGwire story was only the latest evidence of our society's basically tolerant attitude toward doping people in various ways (Hoberman, 1998, p.3).

In the USA, the definition of doping in sport differs from the IOC not only in respect to the use of steroids. A further difference is that in the USA one does not differentiate between the use of performance enhancing and recreational drugs in sport. The use of both forms of drug is judged from the viewpoint of constitutional law and not just from the viewpoint of the sport organizations.

The NFL (football) organized random drug testing in 1990. In the other sports, measures against illegal drugs are more intended to curb the use of soft and hard drugs among athletes. Major League Baseball, America's traditional family sport, did not check for steroids until 2002. And in the NBA (basketball) the important issue is not doping but the use of marijuana. There are no tests after a player's first year. The NHL (hockey) doesn't have mandatory drug testing.

For most sport organizations outside the USA, the problem of doping in sports is predominantly a question of fairness. Taking drugs is defined as an unfair way to enhance performances. If an athlete takes drugs that do not enhance their performances, this is not of great interest to these organizations. However, in the USA the use of both types of drugs is defined as one and the same problem. Often the use of alcohol also is added as a part of this problem (Kahn, 20/7/'98). In American professional team sports the problem of "fairness" in relation to drugs is not an important consideration. A number of professional players do use cocaine and marijuana -

⁵ This coincided with the more liberal attitude of the American government toward steroids, which also reflects in the trade conflict between the USA and Europe about the export of American meat. The Americans do not object to traces of steroids in the meat they consume, the Europeans do. That is the reason they prohibit the import of American meat (New York Times, 9/5/'97).

probably not to enhance their performance, but as a way to relax. The problem of doping in sports is conflated with the larger social problem of controlled substance use outside the world of sports. That too, is the way the problem is defined in intercollegiate amateur sports (Dodd, 21/7/'98). These American sports are a world of their own, with a specific doping culture.

For a long time, the Olympics organized just one subdivision of the world of sport. It represented one doping culture in sport alongside others. The IOC was able to enforce its definition of doping just in a limited number of amateur sports. Moreover, even in some of these amateur sports that fell under the jurisdiction of the IOC, athletes and their coaches acted in secret according to their own definitions of doping. In most professional sports more liberal views on doping dominated. In the GDR and Russia athletes using doping were assured of the help of their governments. In strength sports steroids were popular before they were banned. After they were banned, they could be used for a long time with profit, without great risks of detection.

MEDIA SPORTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS

In this section, I provide an overview of the developments that led to a new relation between the doping cultures that I have identified. All doping cultures in sport were confronted with the policy of one new organization, the World Anti-Drug Agency (WADA), which was founded in 1999. As a result, one can observe a process of forced integration of the doping cultures in sports that have been described. All sectors of sport had to adapt their practices and views on doping according to the definition of doping of the WADA, the new powerful moral entrepreneur in international sports.

To understand why the IOC, and especially its medical commission, lost its autonomy during the 1990s and became part of a larger and potentially more powerful anti-drug organization, it is necessary to investigate the relations between the American and the Olympic doping cultures.

In 1999, under American pressure, the WADA was formed as an organization supported by, but independent of, the IOC. The leader in the American War on Drugs, Barry R. McCaffrey (under president Clinton director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), did not want a private organization for the control of drugs in sport, but an organization associated with politically responsible representatives of national states. Tony Banks, the British sports minister supported him (Ferstle, 2001, p.279). In contrast with the 1960s, this time state governments were able to act effective and with serious consequences. One reason was that McCaffrey defined the fight against

doping as part of the American War on Drugs. Doping was no longer defined as an issue limited to the world of sport, but as one that seriously mattered to the wider society. For McCaffrey, doping should be suppressed, not because it was unhealthy or unfair, but because it set a bad example for American youth. He did not differentiate between doping and other drugs that are taken for relaxation. According to McCaffrey, for many youngsters top athletes function as role models. If their role models achieved success through the use of drugs, how could McCaffrey hope to restrict their use and that of other drugs among the young?

Most of all, those who believe in the value of athletics must team up to deliver one simple, clear message to our children about illegal drug use: "Users are losers. Be a winner." (McCaffrey in USA Today 6/4/98).

One year later he stated:

Moreover, this is not just about the elite athletes. It's about 56 million school-age children in America. Last year a half million children in our country used steroids, more girls than boys. Thousands of East German youth in the swimming program have been permanently harmed. We must establish a drug-free Olympics as a critical message to the world's youth that competition is about training, coaching, and values, not dangerous chemical engineering. (McCaffrey. Press Release 10/11/99)

Other proponents for a drug testing organization independent of the IOC, like the representatives of the European Union, did not make this connection. They just did not trust the IOC any more. In 1998, as the consequence of a big corruption scandal, the organization had lost its credibility in the international community. IOC members had accepted favors from representatives of towns that aspired to host Olympic games. In particular IOC members had accepted bribes from representatives of Salt Lake City to influence their decision where to organize the Winter Olympic Games of 2000 (Ferstle, 2001, p.279). Together with McCaffrey, these representatives formed a powerful coalition. Two years after its establishment the WADA removed its headquarters from Lausanne, siege of the IOC, to Montreal. That contributed to its independence from the IOC.

The IOC lost a part of its powers for enforcing its definitions of doping. It was replaced by a more powerful organization, using a definition of doping that encompassed more types of drugs and applied to amateur as well as professional sports. One important reason the IOC had to adopt the

American definition was that most of its finances came from American sources: television rights and sponsorships (Stokvis, 2000, p. 439). Top athletics has become a media sport: sports constructed by sports-, marketing-, and broadcasting organizations for commercial purposes to amuse television viewers. Television viewers have become the final arbiters in sports affairs. Government leaders do not want athletic role models to inspire a segment of the worldwide sports public to use drugs.

However, the IOC retained some of its influence. In the discussions preceding the establishment of WADA, the president of the IOC argued that the Americans were not in the position to criticize the efforts of the IOC to control doping. The Americans tolerated widespread use of drugs in their own professional team sports, while the IOC had already been controlling for drugs since 1968 (SlamNaganoNewsArchive 2/2/'98). As participant in WADA, the IOC stimulated a less tolerant attitude toward the use of steroids in the American professional team sports. The inclusive American definition of drugs supported the more narrowly defined campaign of the IOC against doping and added urgency to that fight. Yet it also involved sports in the politics of the War on Drugs, the fight against all forms of illegal substance use.

This also affected professional cycling. Since the Olympic games were opened for professionals in 1984, the ICU has become more integrated in the Olympic movement and its IOC. The big European road races have become media sport events par excellence. American cyclists are now also playing prominent roles in these races. As a consequence, the ICU came under pressure to bring its relative liberal views on doping in harmony first with the views of the IOC and later those of WADA. However, the ICU is confronted with the problem that sanctions proposed by WADA against the use of doping can't be upheld in civil lawsuits. Exclusion from participating in competitions for two years is, according to the ICU, against the laws on labor of most Western countries. This viewpoint is shared by the international soccer organization (FIFA) (Ferstle, 2001, p. 284). This means that the establishment of WADA did not result in a firmly united social reaction against the use of drugs in sport. It politicized the battle and undermined the independence of the IOC in its own fight against doping. We can expect a continuation of the clashes between doping cultures.

CONCLUSION

In this article, the fight against doping has been analyzed as an ongoing process of social definition. It is dependent on the development of power relations within and outside the world of sport. To

analyze these dependencies, I identified a variety of important doping cultures in sport and studied the development of the power relations between the supporters of these cultures during the second half of the twentieth century. During the first two decades of the Cold War, the IOC acted as a moral entrepreneur, and formulated its definition of the doping as an unfair practice contrary to the principles of amateur sports. Supported by the international prestige of the Olympics in the public discourse this became the dominant social definition. However, because of a lack of organizational capabilities and the split within the IOC between capitalist and communist countries, the IOC was not able to act effectively on the basis of its own definition. Moreover, during the greater part of the twentieth century the authority of the IOC was restricted to just a limited number of amateur sports. The IOC had no authority in a sport as professional cycling, notorious for the use of doping. American professional team sports functioned as a world of its own, completely independent from the IOC. Measures to control doping, including steroids, in American team sports were taken after state officials included sport in their War on Drugs. This coincided more or less with the end of the Cold War in 1989.

State and sport authorities in the USA held more inclusive views on doping, different from those of the IOC. During the 1990's the IOC has been forced to adapt its definition of doping to the policies of the American government. The IOC could not afford to alienate the American public, especially its broadcasting organizations, from the Olympics. The definition of American state and sport officials has become dominant in the social definition of doping. These new powerful moral entrepreneurs defined doping as one more stimulus for the young to use drugs. Earlier objections against doping based on Olympic codes of amateurism have been integrated into the new definition. However, even WADA, a new state-supported organization to control doping, with its expanded organizational capabilities, has not been able to enforce one unanimous doping culture in the world of sports.

The relevance of discussing doping in terms of doping cultures is that drug use should not be considered simply as an act of individual cheating, but as an institutionalized activity in certain sectors of sport. The existence of a culture presupposes a certain degree of organization of its participants. Those who wish to fight doping in sports should try to attack this organization. They should not just test individual athletes for doping. On top of this they should look for those who produce and distribute the drugs and those who teach the athletes to use them.

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