The German EU Presidency and Energy Policy Towards Russia

Insights From Liberal Intergovernmentalist and Institutionalist Approaches

 

This article analyses the formation and development of Member State preferences and
positions before and during the European Union (EU) Presidency term. We question the
extent to which Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) furthers our understanding of state1
behaviour in the context of holding the EU Presidency. Our findings suggest that LI
adequately explains the formation of German positions prior to assuming office, as
German policy objectives chiefly reflect and stand for domestic producers’ interests.
However, LI cannot satisfactorily account for German governmental action after taking
on the Presidency role, during which time it largely downplayed domestic preferences.
Instead, Presidency norms dominated its action. For a (substantially) enhanced
understanding of governmental behaviour during the Presidency we advocate drawing on
institutionalist approaches which we go on to substantiate empirically. Rational choice
institutionalism (RCI) highlights Germany’s restraint from defending its original
domestic preferences due to rational calculation embedded in normative (Presidency)
constraints. Compliance with Presidency norms of impartiality (and consensusbuilding/
solidarity) was considered advantageous, as it safeguarded Germany’s mediator
role, because of diffuse long-term reputational concerns, and due to peer pressure.
Sociological institutionalism (SI) can account for the reprioritisation of objectives mainly
through the taken-for-grantedness of Presidency norms (that have been thoroughly
internalised). We argue that RCI and SI can in many respects be regarded as
complementary rather than competing.